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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\ 
CHARLES THOMAS DUFFY I Plaintiff and Responde11t vs. Case No. 7294 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
CO~IP AXY. a corporation, 
Defend-ant and Appellant 
BRIEF OF RESPOXDENT 
STATE~IEKT OF FACTS 
A. PRELI~fiNARY STATE~IENT 
z: The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
All italics are ours. 
Plaintiff deems it advisable to make a complete and 
comprehensive statement of facts in order that the Court 
may be fully advised with respect to all issues presented 
by appellant's brief. 
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The event resulting in the injuries to plaintiff OC-
curred while he was engaged in the performance of his 
duties as a brakeman at Milford, Utah, at about the 
hour of 4 :45 o'clock p.m. on the 29th day of January, 
1947. 
His action was filed in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, where the mat-
ter was tried before a jury. The jury's verdict, dated 
October 5, 1948, is as follows (R. 21): 
''We the Jurors impaneled in the above case, 
find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant and assess plaintiff's damages as 
follows: 
Total Damages ----------------------------$12,500.00 
Diminution by reason of contri-
butory negligence, if any ____ 3,500.00 
Amount of Verdict given --------$ 9,000.00" 
The defendant's Motion for New 'Trial was denied 
on the 5th day of N ovemher, 1948. 
In his complaint, plaintiff charged defendant with 
negleet in failing to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe 
place to work, in that it maintained the low ground 
switch connecting the crossover with No. 1 Track at 
Milford, Utah in a dangerous and unsafe condition, by 
allowing sand, gravel and debris to accumulate and be-
come packed around the rod connecting the switch S't.and 
with the switch points so that the switch could not be 
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manipulated without extren1e, unnatural and unusual 
physical exertion. 
Plaintiff also charged defendant with failing to fur-
nish plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work in that it 
allowed drainage water to accumulate around said switch 
stand and around the switch rod connecting the stand 
with the tracks so that in cold and freezing weather water 
would and did freeze around the switch rod rendering 
it unusually difficult for a person to throw the switch. 
Plaintiff also charged defendant with neglect gen-
erally in keeping and maintaining the switch in a danger-
ous and unsafe condition in that it so kept and main-
tained the switch that it could not be thrown without 
unusual, unnatural and extreme physical exertion. 
Defendant admitted that it was engaged as a com-
mon carrier by rail in interstate commerce at the time of 
plaintiff's injury and that plaintiff was engaged in the 
performance of his duties at the time and place of his 
injury, but denied the other allegations of the complaint. 
Upon admitted facts the remedy afforded plaintiff 
is controlled by the provisions of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A., Section 51, providing, in so 
far as material here, as follows: 
''Every common carrier by railroad while 
engaged in commerce between any of 'the several 
states or territories shall be liable in damages to 
any person suffering injury while. he is employed 
by such carrier in such commerce * * * for such 
injury resulting in whole or in part * * * by rea-
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4 
son of any defect or insufficiency, due to its neg-
ligence, in its * * * appliances, track, roadbed 
* * * or other equipment.'' 
There was no material conflict in the testimony. The 
evidence conclusively demonS'trated that plaintiff was 
injured in the course of his employment and that he was 
injured as a result of the dang·erous and unsafe condition 
of the switch. 
Under the evidence the negligence of defendant be-
came a question for the jury and the jury, upon proper 
instructions, found defendant negligent as charged. 
Defendant, in its brief, has conceded that its negli-
gence was and became a question for the jury in the 
following language (p. 6): 
'' * * * Since we do not intend upon this 
appeal to question the sufficiency of plaintiff's 
evidence to justify submission of this case to a 
jury, there is no purpose to be served by detail-
ing any further the difficulties which Duffy en-
countered in throwing the switch nor his evidence 
as to its difficulty of operation." 
Defendant assigns as error refusal of the court 
to grant its motion for a new trial, contending ·that the 
verdict was excessive and returned under the influence 
of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury, and that 
certain other errors were committed by the court in its 
instructions to the jury. 
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B. THE FACTS 
Charles Thomas Duffy, the plaintiff, at the time of 
his injuries, was 63 years of age. He had been working 
for the Union Pacific Railroad Company for approxi-
mately 28 years, during most of which time he had been 
employed as a brakeman. At the time of his injuries he 
was working as the rear brakeman, traveling from Cal-
iente, Xevada to Salt Lake City, Utah, on Train No. 
44, which was a mail and express train (R. 92). This 
train necessarily had to travel through the railroad 
company's yards at :\Iilford, Utah. The main line track, 
upon which the train was traveling, was a single track 
and at :\Iilford, Utah the railroad company maintained 
a yard in which a track, known as No.1 Track, ran gen-
erally parallel with the main line and immediately south 
thereof. :Jiovements were made from the main line track 
to track No. 1 by way of a Crossover Track at the west 
end of the yard (R. 95, 96, 98). 
On plaintiff's return trip frmn Caliente, Ne-
vada to Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 29th, 1947, 
his train proceeded through Milford in a general easterly 
direction. As the 'train approached Milford his crew re-
ceived information that they were to meet another train 
in that vicinity, and that the other train was superior, 
so that it became necessary for plaintiff and the mem-
hers of his crew to move Train No. 44 from the main line 
track onto No. 1 Track. When the train arrived at a 
point where the crossover connected the main line track 
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with No. 1 'Track they slowed down and the head brake-
man changed the switch connecting 'the main line track 
with the crossover, proceeded to the switch connecting 
the crossover to No. 1 Track, and the train passed 
through the crossover. It then and there became plain-
tiff's duty ·to change the erossover switches back to their 
normal positions after the rear of the train had passed 
onto No. 1 Track. He dropped off the caboose, changed 
the switch connecting the crossover with the main line 
track and thereafter approached and was in the process 
of changing the switch connecting the crossover track 
and No. 1 'Track when he suffered and sustained the 
injuries complained of. 
The crossover switches involved herein are low 
ground throw switches. They are operated by a lever 
approximately the length of a yardstick. These are two 
of the most important switches in the yard and are used 
several times during the course of every days work (R. 
141, 143). Plaintiff had no difficulty in handling the out-
side crossover switch connecting the main line with the 
crossover on this occasion. He· testified (R. 96): 
'' Q. And did you handle this outside crossover 
switch at that time~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Did you have any difficulty handling that 
switch~ 
A. No sir." 
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He then approached the inside crossover switch, unlocked 
and raised the handle and tried to throw 'the switch with 
both hands. He could not get it above an upright position 
with the nse of his two hands. He then placed his right 
hand on the switch and his left on the lamp post at the 
s"-i tc h stand in order to get more leverage and pushed 
outward with both hands. It was at that point that he felt 
a severe sharp pain in the pit of his stomach (R. 126-
131). 
On the 20th day of September, 1946, approximately 
four months before the accident, plaintiff had been oper-
ated on for removal of a gall bladder. He had been hos-
pitalized for a number of days and had been released 
for work on the 18th day of November, 1946. He had 
worked continuously from the 20th day of November, 
1946, up to and including the 29th day of January, 1947, 
the date that he was injured. During that time he had 
experienced no trouble in performing the duties of his 
employment; had thrown many switches without any 
difficulty whatsoever (R. 108). 
Following the accident plaintiff continued with his 
train to Salt Lake City and reported to Dr. Rees Ander-
son who discovered an incisional hernia in the area of 
the previous operation (R. 125, 126). He continued to 
work, wearing a support, until the 28th day of February, 
1947 (R. 131). On the 3rd day of March, 1947, he en-
tered a Salt Lake hospital and on the 4th day of March, 
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1947, was operated on for correction of the incisional . 
hernia (R. 136, 137). He sustained a loss of wages as 
a result of the accident in the amount of $1,300.00 (R. 
132, 133). 
MANNER IN WHICH PLAINTIFF MANIPULATED SWITCH 
Plaintiff described the manner in which he manipu-
lated the switch as follows: 
''A. * * * Then I got down and unlocked this 
switch, H is a lock switch, this. I raised it up; I 
got it up to here, and I got it over to there with 
both hands and I couldn't get it no farther. You 
see, there is a lamp here on the top of this switch 
and after I got this thing over to here I couldn't 
get it no farther. I turned my hand on that lever, 
like that, and I put my hand against the lamp to 
get more leverage and then I felt this pain. 
Q. All right. Now you can take the stand 
again, Mr. Duffy. Had you experienced any dif-
ficulty in handling the switch from the main line 
on to the crossover 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How had you done that job1 
A. That job worked all right. The job was 
relined. All I had to do was reline that switch 
back to the main track. 
Q. How did you do that 1 
A. It worked all right. By the same motion 
as I did the other switch. (R. 109) 
* * * * 
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it up to here, then took both hands and shoved it 
to here; couldn't shove (R. 116) it any farther, I 
turned Iny hand- * * * on the lever, like this, and 
put n1y hand against the lamp, or top of the 
switrh, then I shoved that way when I got it back. 
Q. Just as you shoved-
A.. T es, just as I stretched out, put the 
weight on here, and braced against the lamp, it 
was kind of slippery under foot, ice and mud, then 
I pushed it on down and locked it." (R. 117) 
The testimony fully revealed that plaintiff complied 
with the customary and usual procedure in handling this 
type of switch. 
Defendant's witness, George Alexander Connell, 
testified that the natural way to throw a switch was by 
use of the hands, and that the manner in which the hands 
were used on the switch depended upon the individual 
(R. 247). He also testified that the safest way of hand-
ling the switch was by use of the hands rather than the 
feet. He also testified that it is customary and usual 
for switchmen to throw a switch which is difficult to mani-
pulate by using every possible means of leverage that 
is convenient for the individual using the switch (R. 
252). 
Mr. Alvey Robinson, another of defendant's wit-
nesses, also testified that the normal way in which to 
throw a switch is by use of the hands and that it. is safer 
to ·throw a switch by use of the hands (R. 269, 270). He 
also testifed that the normal, usual and customary man-
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ner of throwing a switch is to use every effort that can 
be used to bring the switch points together and to obtain 
the best leverage possible in order to do so, and that it 
would be customary and usual for a switchman, charged 
with the responsibility of closing the switch, to use all of 
the effort and strength at his command, if necessary, in 
order to accomplish the operation of changing the switch 
(R. 265, 266). 
It will be noted that the plaintiff's train had 
proceeded on some distance to the depot leaving him 
alone with the switch, and that he was required to change 
the switch before walking the considerable distance to the 
depot and mounting his train. The blocks would not 
clear until the switch had been changed. 
CONDITION OF THE SWITCH 
That the switch involved in this action was negli-
gently maintained was abundantly proven by the evi-
dence. 
The switch was a low ground type. Extending from 
the switch stand to the switch points was a block signal 
connecting rod. When the switch is thrown the connect-
ing rod rotates in a rotary motion. Also connecting the 
switch stand with the switch points, running along he-
tween the switch ties, is the main switch rod which is the 
mechanism that actually changes the switch points (R. 
101, 102 -Exs. "D" and "E"). The ground under-
neath the switch rod and bridle rod that connects with 
the lever which throws the switch, at the time of the 
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accident. came up to the level of the switch rod and 
bridle rod and was icy and half frozen. There was water 
in the area of the rod. When the lever was pulled H 
would pull the rod through the frozen ground. (R. 117, 
118). There was a knuckle on the end of the rod and 
when the switch was thrown this knuckle would have to 
rotate down through the frozen mud and ice. The knuckle 
extended into the mud and ice probably three-quarters 
of an inch (R.11s;119, 144, 145). 
There was a general slope in the area of the tracks 
and the natural drainage of water was down into the 
low ground switches involved herein (R. 120, 121). The 
slope extended from the roundhouse track toward the 
switch where plaintiff was injured (R. 121, 122-Ex. 
"B"). 
There was no drainage whatsoever away from the 
switch and the water which might accumulate around 
the switch would either have to soak into the ground or 
be bailed out. In the winter when there was a thaw it 
was customary to bail the water out from around the 
switch (R. 122, 123). In addition, engines which were 
required to stand on the roundhouse track, after being 
watered at the water tank (Ex. "A"), would exhaust 
five or six gallons of water which would spill over and 
run down into the switch where plaintiff was injured 
(R. 122). 
In manipulating a low ground switch it is more dif-
ficult to move the switch after it reaches a vertical posi-
tion than before because at that time the switch points 
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12 
are coming up against the rail and making the contact 
(R. 147). 
When a train or heavy equipment would go over the 
crossover and switch points involved there would be 
some up and down movement which caused mud, 
ice and water to ooze upward and around the switch 
points (R. 150). Mud, water and ice also accumulated 
around the top of the tie-plates where the switch 
points traveled back and forth, and sand dropping down 
from the sanders of heavy equipment passing over 
the switch points mixed in with the mud and ice making 
a sort of hard paste rendered the switch much more 
difficult to throw (R. 151). At the time when the ac-
cident occurred the weather was freezing and the mud 
around the switch involved was half frozen and mixed 
with ice (R. 152). 
Throwing the switch from its normal position to the 
position allowing trains to pass from the crossover 
onto No. 1 'Track was easier than throwing the switch 
back to its other position (R. 155). 
Switchmen, other than the plaintiff himself, who 
were well acquainted with the crossover switches, and 
in particular the one where paintiff was injured, sup-
ported his testimony in regard to the condition of the 
switches. Jack C. Mahoney, an engine foreman, with 
many years of experience in the Milford yards, testified 
that during freezing weather in l\iilford both of the main 
line switches, referred to in 'the evidence, would run full 
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of water and freeze and would at various times be filled 
up with sand due to the starting of locomotives out of 
the No. 1 Track ( R. 159) ; that this would cause the 
switch to ''throw harder'' and if too much sand got into 
the switch it would require cleaning and oiling (R. 160). 
He also testified that during the month of January there 
had been numerous occasions when it was necessary to 
call out the section gang in order to throw the switch 
when it would freeze up, and that on occasions it was 
necessary for the night shift to leave the mov-ement of 
cars for the day shift because of the impossibility of 
operating the switch, it being necessary for the section 
gang to dig out the switch (R. 161). 
This witness further testified to the inadequacy of 
drainage when he related the necessity of calling out 
bucket brigades to remove the water which accumu-
lated around these switches whenever there was a thaw. 
(R. 164, 165). 
Harold Wilford Renshaw, an experienced switch-
man, well acquainted with the Milford yards and the 
switch involved in this case, testified that during the 
month of January, 1947 he had experienced difficulty in 
manipulating both of these main line switches (R. 197). 
He related that about January lOth he noticed that as 
the train went over the switches the mud and water kept 
slushing up and down, the ties sinking about 3 or 4 
inches. He further stated that on this occasion he at-
tempted to throw the switch here involved and because 
of the difficulty he experienced it was necessary for them 
to stop the train. After three or four tries he was finally 
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able to lock the switch. On another occasion, around 
the 15th or 18th of January, he worked on this switch 
for ten minutes. Because of the delay the engineer 
came over to the switch and also attempted to throw 
it but he also was unable to lock the switch. It was 
then necessary for them to back up the train and forego 
the use of this switch because of their inability to mani-
pulate it (R. 198-200). 
David Leonard Muir, a switchman of 25 years ex-
perience with the Union Pacific Railroad Company 
who had worked at Milford for many years, testified that 
the overflow from the wa:ter tank and injectors on the 
engine caused water to accumulate at the switch here 
involved. This water would freeze up and cause the 
body locks of the switch to freeze solidly. He also testi-
fied that engines and trains moving over these switches 
would cause the ice to break up and that small 
chunks of ice would get into the switches and make them 
hard to throw (R. 220-222). He also described the con-
dition caused by sand getting in between the switch 
points and slide rods and making the switch hard to 
throw ( R. 222-224) .. 
Byron Pulham testified that on occasions he found 
it impossible to throw the switch and as a result 
he would be unable to do the work until he could 
contact the section foreman to clean out the switch and 
make it useable ( R. 228, 229). 
Even Alvey Robinson and William Riley Hunter 
were unable to controvert the great weight of the 'testi-
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mony of plaintiff's witnesses regarding the condition of 
the switch (R. 267, 268, 292, 293). 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER SWITCHES 
The switch involved in this case was exceptionally 
difficult to manipulate and handle in comparison with 
other switches of its type and kind used by the defendant 
company at .Milford and elsewhere. Plaintiff testified: 
"Q. You have had occasion to observe other 
s·witches of this kind, you've stated, before~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And over a long period of time~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, from your observation of other 
switches, both in the Milford yard, and other 
places where you have observed them, what can 
you say with respect to the ordinary and usual 
and customary condition of those switches- and 
I have reference to the space between the dirt and 
the rods which you have shown us in the photo-
graph~ 
A. Well, many other switches is all the way 
from two to three inch clearance below those rods 
for drainage. 
Q. And what effect does that have on the 
operation of the switches, as you have observed 
them~ 
A. That clearance, is that what you mean~ 
Q. Yes. 
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A. Clearance makes them throw more freely. 
(R. 119) h~ 
• * * • 
Q. Now, Mr. Duffy compared with other low 
ground switches which you ordinarily and cus-
tomarily use and rnani pulate on your run, how 
does this-how does this switch, generally, as you 
observed it on the various occasions when you 
have (R. 152) manipulated it, compare-
• * * * 
til 
ar 
ill 
Q. How does it compare in regard to the th 
ease or difficulty in the use of switches~ m 
A. It works hard. 
* * * * 
A. I say, it works extra hard.'' (R. 153) 
Harold Wilford Renshaw drew a remarkable com-
parison of this switch with other switches of the same 
type and kind regarding comparative ease and difficulty 
of operation. 
"Q. Mr. Renshaw, in your experience in Mil-
ford in handling the various ground switches in 
Milford and in other places, how did the oper-
ability or the ease or difficulty in the operation 
of this inside cross-over switch compare with 
other switches of similar type in l\iilford and in 
other places where you were working in January, 
1947~ 
ti 
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A. "'\Yell, that switch there has always been 
hard for me to throw at any time in the winter 
time. 
Q. And why~ 
A. In the summer time, when ties are warm 
and it is clean they have got plenty of oil on it, 
guy can throw it without any effort; but, in the 
winter time when that mud and ice or water, I 
mean, slushes up and down, and as these cars go 
over it, you know, you have seen ties sink that 
when weight goes over them, water splash up and 
mud will seem ·to get in and that rod slides across 
there, where usually most switches got about that 
much-
* * * * 
A. Well, there is no clearance in there for 
water and that, to drain off, like most switches. 
There is about five or six inches clearance there, 
that rod that guides (R. 201) that switch point. 
Q. On this switch, is it different~ 
A. Yes-well, that one is different, and the 
main line switches and i)lat, they are all kept 
cleaned out and clear of everything. If any water 
in them, ·they drain off. 'That one spot, there is 
always water there, even in the summer time. 
(R. 202) 
* * * * 
Q. Now, I think you stated ·that in the sum-
mer time when there was oil in the switch, that 
it was easy enough for you to throw~ 
A. Yes, without any hard-
Q. When the weather was cool, it was hard 
to throw~ 
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A. That's right. 
Q. That is generally true with all low 
ground switches, isn't it~ 
A. Not necessarily. 
Q. Well, doesn't the oil getting cold in 'the 
switch make H harder to throw~ 
A. Well, not oil, not if it is oiled good, water 
won't stick on oil, I don't believe." (R. 204) 
Byron Pulham also noted a remarkable difference 
between this switch and the other low ground type 
switches used by the defendant railroad company in 
other places. 
'' Q. All right. Tell us how that switch usu-
ally works as compared with other low ground 
type switches~ 
A. Well, that switch, its pretty low, and in 
the wintertime I have trouble with it because it is 
frozen up quite often. You can't throw it. It 
seems to be low enough, that is if the snow melts 
or an engine standing there with an injector the 
water runs in there and it gets on the cross bar 
and freezes the points and you can't throw the 
switch." (R. 227) 
CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF INJURY 
Charles Thomas Duffy, the plaintiff, testified in 
relation to his injuries as follows: 
''A. Well, I had a sharp pain in my stomach 
and burning sensation which felt like warm water 
running over my stomach, a stinging sensation. 
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Q. And at that time when you felt that pain 
just where were you in the process of handling 
this switch! 
A. That "~as when I just put the switch 
down, the switch lever down. It lasted probably 
seYen or eight minutes and it kind of left. (R. 113) 
Q. And during that period, from the time 
you left 1Iilford until the time you arrived at 
Salt Lake, will you describe your physical con-
dition to the jury~ 
A. During the time we left l\filford I went 
in and sat down and I talked to the conductor 
about it and he said, 'Do you think you hurt 
yourself?' I said, 'I've got an awful sharp pain 
there.' (R. 114) 
A. Well, after throwing this switch, I had 
severe pain right in the pit of my stomach here, 
and, as I said before, felt like there was some 
water running, out, maybe I had broken open. 
After I had went on the train, went in the 
dressing room, opened up my shirt, looked, it was 
all right, only red, little bit red. 
* * * * 
A. Night when I got home I still had the 
pain, but the area red was larger. 
Q. Were you able to sleep that night~ 
A. Not very well; I rolled around quite a 
bit, quite painful; felt stiff like. 
Q. Did you do anything for the pain~ 
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A. No, I couldn't. I didn't get in Salt Lake 
City until sometime around seven-thirty. 
Q. Now, after you saw the doctor, or at the 
time you, saw the doctor, did he recommend any 
treatment for you, or any future medical care~ 
A. No ; I asked him, and he told me he would 
have to have-to perform an operation on there, 
and do that job over again, that I had torn it 
loose inside.' ' ( R. 126) 
* * * * 
Until the second operation was performed plaintiff 
wore a heavy canvas belt. 
''A. Strapped around me underneath, then 
pulled up tight. He said hold it together; hold it 
to keep from tearing any more, if I happened to 
get up, I got a hard pop, or something. 
Q. Stand up and just point on your body to 
it; just point to the place where that incision is-
A. Incision is right in here, through here. 
Q. ( Continued)-to the jury, so the jury can 
see. 
A. Right in through here, probably ten in-
ches. 
Q. About how long would you say that is? 
A. About ten inches. 
Q. About ten inches~ 
A. About, I should say. 
Q. Run vertical~ 
A. Yes, straight up and down. (R. 127) 
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Q. Is that the incision that was made when 
gall bladder operation was performed~ 
A. Same one. 
Q. And-
~\. Same length. 
Q. Where with respect to that incision was 
it that this pain occurred~ 
up. 
A. It was in the upper part, about that far 
Q. The upper part of the incision? 
A. Yes. 
Q. N" ow, you stated that you went to the 
hospital for an operation~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And from the time that you saw the doc-
tor until you went to the hospital for the opera-
tion what can you say about the presence or ab-
sence of pain~ 
A. \Yell, I had pain now and then! more of a 
trial, you know, sometimes get a sharp pain. 
Q. Could you stoop down~ 
A. If I stooped down I seemed like some-
thing was moving up, like that. 
Q. How about evenings, and your ability to 
sleep¥ 
A. I slept fairly well about a week after-
ward. (R. 128) 
Q. Were you conscious or unconscious when 
the operation was performed~ 
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A. Well, I was conscious when he started, 
but I don't remember it. I remember them s·tart-
ing to cut, just feel like something scraping. (R. 
129) 
* * * * 
A. Well, I couldn't see-they wouldn't let 
me raise my head up to see. They had some rubber 
sort of thing over my head, and held my head 
down. I couldn't raise up to see, but I could fee~ 
then, when they started to cut, but not for long. 
Q. How long were you on the operating 
table~ 
A. I believe it was an hour and forty-five 
minutes. 
Q. Now, after the operation had been per-
formed, you remained in the hospital for some 
time, did you not~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. About how many days~ 
A. Well, about fourteen days. 
Q. And was there any treatment given to 
you during that fourteen days of your hospital-
ization~ 
A. Well, the first five or six days there I had 
several hypodermics, and morphine tablets at 
night. 
Q. Were you able to sleep at night~ (R. 129) 
A. When I got them; I couldn't sleep other-
wise. 
Q. And what can you say with respect to 
the presence or absence of pain during that four-
teen days~ 
a 
ft 
Dr. l 
l~rremo· 
a: 
pr 
~ 
ft 
ti 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
··-
/ 
23 
.A. 'Yell, there was quite a burning, sharp, 
shooting pain all the time. · 
Q. Did yon return directly home after the-
after your hospitalization period Y 
~\.. Yes, I went right hon1e. 
Q. Ann, after you were home, were you able 
to get up and about, or not. 
~\.. X o ; when I came home, I came home in 
a cab. Went to bed as soon as I got home, didn't 
feel like sitting up. 
Q. How long were you in bed? 
A. Oh, I was in bed five or six hours, then 
I would get up, sit down a while, then go back to 
bed again, get dizzy like when I would get up. 
Q. After you were at home, and during this 
period, what can you say about the pain? 
A. Pain? Yes, I had pain when I came home. 
but I had some pills, morphine tablets they would 
give me in the hospital, when I left.'' (R. 130) 
Dr. Rees H. Anderson described the first operation 
for removal of the gall bladder as follows : 
'' Q. Then, when that incision was made, I 
assume that the stomach is taken out¥ 
A. Stomach is retracted to the side of ex-
posed gall bladder area, and then, by proper sur-
gical procedure, it was-your removal was ef-
fected. This included dissections and proper liga-
tion of the blood vessels, and other parts of the 
anatomy, which is a technical procedure, and that 
was carried out. 
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Q. I see. Now, in order that you could get 
into the stomach and 'retracted,' as you indicate, 
and then remove the gall bladder, what ·tissue or 
flesh or muscles were necessary for you to cut 
through to make this incision you have described¥ 
(R. 176) 
A. Like to make this clear; I will try to 
avoid the technical language; the abdomen is, 
roughly, composed of several layers of tissue. 
There is the skin, then a layer of fat, ·then a layer 
of muscle, which is covered by what we call fascia, 
fascia, a hard, dense tissue under which is what 
we call the peritoneal lining, very soft or flexible 
tissues. 
Q. That fascia is what is termed as the real 
support, isn't it¥ 
A. That is correct; these various layers 
were all cut through to open in the stomach by the 
abdominal cavity. 
Q. Now, after the operation I assume you 
sewed up these-the coverings, including the fas-
cia that you have described, after the operation 1 
A. That is correct. I might explain exactly, 
in detail, what was done. In ·effect, the various 
layers were sewed together, or approximated, 
with suture material, with possibly one exception 
at the lower angle of the wound, where a rubber 
tube drain was brought out through this part of 
the layers of the abdomen. This was a technical 
procedure which was considered necessary in this 
particular case. 
Q. Is it always necessary to place a drain in 
the wound after a gall bladder operation¥ 
A. No sir, there are many cases that no 
drain whatsoever is used. 
r: 
ar 
r]f 
tl 
lll 
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Q. The drain. I assuine, delays the healing, 
or at least the-yes, the healing of the fascia, 
and other layers of the skin and muscle1 (R. 177) 
A. Yes sir, the drain necessarily delays the 
healing of all the layers. 
Q. How long was the drain left in the plain-
tiff, Duffy! 
A. Ordinarily three to four to five days, 
depending on the circumstances or the condition 
for which it was placed. 
Q. I see. Now, I think you said in this case 
these-the fascia and these other coverings were 
not overlapped but just sutured together1 
A. Approximated; that is usually custo-
mary. 
* * * * 
Q. And you sewed them together~ 
A. \Yith suture material, yes sir." (R. 178) 
The doctor testified regarding plaintiff's medical 
treatment following his injury as follows: 
'' Q. You say January 31st. At that time, did 
you examine the area where you had performed 
this incision 1 
A. That is correct. 
Q. What did you find 1 
A. He had a protruding mass into the scar, 
in the lower end of the scar, which, on proper 
examination, indicated to me that it was what 
we term an 'incisional hernia.' ( R. 180) 
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Q. 'Incisional hernia', what do you mean 
by that¥ 
A. That is a hernia-many types of hernias, 
and the lay terminology, a hernia is a rupture. 
Many types-four or five types of hernia-an in-
cisional hernia one occurs through a previously 
operated wound or incision. 
Q. Now, had you ever observed on him any 
evidence of any hernia before this¥ 
A. No sir. 
Q. He talked to you about his injury, I take 
it¥ 
A. Yes. (R. 181) 
:jj: • * * 
Q. When you operated him, what did you 
find~ 
A. I found that these various layers of 
tissue, which we have described before, several 
layers, some of them had healed properly in their 
normal position, and the main fascia layer had 
not healed, but it had spread apart and become 
separated. This allowed the soft tissue to bulge 
forward, and that was, in effect, what is the con-
dition he had. 
Q. Now, will you describe to the jury this 
incisional hernia; what part of his body pro-
truded through this opening, where the incision 
previous had been made~ 
A. I couldn't say for sure, but, from its 
location, I would assume that it was the stomach 
and the viscera in the upper part of the abdomen, 
the intestines, possibly the colon, which protruded 
through this defect, largely the stomach. (R. 181) 
al 
\\'I 
rr 
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Q. Largely the stomach that protruded 
through that area where the incisi-on was origin-
ally n1ade for the operation for gall bladder~ 
A. It would protrude at times; it wasn't al-
ways out there, but-
Q. But it was serious enough you felt it 
should be operated~ 
A .. Yes. 
Q. ~-\nd then, of course, that is why you 
operated? 
~-\.. That's right. (R. 182) 
* * * * 
Q. Do you know what usually causes hernia~ 
A. I would say the cause of hernias is a 
combination of many factors. (R. 182) 
* * * * 
Q. Now, I will ask you if you have an opin-
ion as to whether or not a strain would have a 
tendency to push the stomach through that weak-
ened portion of the stomach wall~ 
A. That's correct. 
Q. I assume you have performed numerous 
operations such as a gall bladder operation, and 
as the operation for incisional hernia~ 
A. Yes sir, I have. If you may permit, re-
cently qualified to be one of the American Col-
lege of Surgeons, which requires a great number 
of these similar types of cases. 
Q. And, would you say, from your exper-
ience, that this type of operation is a serious 
operation~ 
A. Yes. (R. 183) 
* * * * 
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Q. Can you give me some idea, if you know, 
is there a certain percentage of cases where it 
recurs or where you get a hernia from an opera-
tion of this kind, subsequently~ 
A. My best judgment, experience, would 
indicate somewhere between five and ten per cent, 
I don't know exactly; you would have to study 
a series of cases. 
Q. And-but you think maybe five or ten 
per cent there is a hernia, an incisional hernia, 
following such an operation~ 
A. Yes sir. (R. 186) 
* * * * 
Q. And do you remember why it wasn't 
done then, and delayed until March~ 
A. I don't know the exact reason. I think p: 
that, that perhaps we decided to temporize with 
the belt, or something of that sort until he was-
/ don't think that he was particularly prepared rJI 
to undergo ·another operation, mentally, at that ~ 
pa.r1t~cular time. (R. 188) l: 
fl] 
* * * * a! 
w 
Q. Then you operated on him on March 4th p, 
or 5th, some place~ II 
A. 5th. 
Q. And was that operation successful~ 
A. To the best of my knowledge, up to the 
time I last examined him. 
Q. And he was in the hospital some thirteen 
days, I think, after that operation~ 
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~-\.. I believe that is correct. 
Q. ~-\nd then, did you see him after he got 
out of the hospital: did you see him in the follow-
ing weeks~ 
~-\.. On seYeral occasions, yes. 
Q. ~-\.bout how often would you see him 1 
A. I think first, possibly every week; little 
later, every two weeks. 
Q. And did he make some complaint of pain, 
to you, at that time when he came to see you~ 
(R. 189) 
A. I will have to refer to the record. Yes, 
he did complain of pain. 
Q. And to what would you attribute his 
pain after, at that time~ 
A. I felt that the pain that he complained 
of was probably due to the fact that we had actu-
ally sutured the fascia in an imbricated or under-
lying fascia, this is bringing it together in a tight 
or unnatural condition. This was a safeguard to 
allow us two or three rows of suture material 
when repaired. I .attribute to the, that technical 
·procedu.r'e for the operation, the subsequent pain. 
(R. 190) 
,.. * * * 
Q. Doctor, you mentioned five to ten per 
cent of the cases of incisional hernia where a 
drain is used-I mean you mentioned that there 
are about five or ten per cent of the cases where 
there is an incisional hernia where a tube has 
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been used, which occur, in the ordinary course of 
events; that is what you meant, isn't it~ (R. 191) 
A. That's right. (R. 192) 
* * * * 
Q. Now, the question I had in mind-and 
this is my last one-the second operation, instead 
of just bringing these walls together, the fascia 
and other walls together, you overlapped them 
and sewed them, didn't you~ 
A. Tha:t is correct. 
Q. Why~ 
A. In any hern~a, the tende·ncy to recur is 
co"YtSiderable. This man developed a hernia from 
his incision. We wanted to safeguard any future 
development of hernia at this site, and that was 
the reason we imbricated over or overlapped the 
fascia, to give us at least two or three lines of 
suturing so that it would be, I guess, 're-en-
forced', you might call it, if you were sewing up 
your pants. (R. 193, 194) 
Q. What, in your ~opinion, might cause a 
recurrence in his case? 
A. I believe the poor tissue, the poor fascia, 
the improper hea.Bing. (R. 194) 
* * * * 
A. We used what we call interrupted su-
tures. It isn't a continuous stitch; it is an in-
·terrupted suture, so that each one is tied and 
cut separately, and there would be at least, an 
estimate would be several dozen, possibly fifty 
or more." -(R. 194) 
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SU~I:\fARY OF ARGU~fENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT DEFENDANT \YAS AN INSURER OF THE SAFETY 
OF ITS EMPLOYEES. 
POINT II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WAS NOT HYPOTHETICAL IN 
NATURE AND ACCURATELY STATED THE LAW OF THE 
CASE. 
POINT III. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 IS A CORRECT STATEMENT 
OF THE LAW. 
POINT IV. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 IS A CORRE'CT AND ACCURATE 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND DID NOT PREJUDICE 
DEFENDANT IN ANY MANNER WHATSOEVER. 
POINT V. 
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT SO EXCESSIVE AS 
TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS DICTATED BY PASSION 
OR PREJUDICE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS AN INSURER OF THE SAFETY 
OF ITS EMPLOYEES. 
Defendant complains of Instruction No. 3 and con-
tends that said instruction constituted reversible error. 
It is a well known principle of law that the charge 
to the jury should be considered as a whole. In 3 Am. 
Jur. Sec. 1097 the rule is stated: 
~I 
kl 
of 
ilihe: 
1 M!enaenl 
l~!orth 
l ~n: 
''The charge to the jury should be considered m 
as a whole by the appellate court, with a view r]r 
to ascertaining, if possible, whether the rights T 
of the complaining party were so prejudiced as to 
prevent a fair trial. If when so considered the 
charge presents the law fairly and correctly to 
the jury, there is no ground for reversing the 
judgrnen t, though some of the expressions, when 
standing alone, might be regarded as erroneous." 
Instruction No. 3 reads in parts as follows: 
''The statute upon which this action is based 
is the Federal Employers Liability Act and said 
Act provides every common carrier by railroad 
while engaging in commerce between any of the 
several states shall be liable in damages to any 
person suffering injury while he is employed by 
such carrier in such commerce, arnd for such in-
jury resultmg in whole ~or in p.art from the negli-
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gence of any of the empDoyees of su,eh carrier ion 
its app~iances, machinery, o.r othe·r equipment. 
The fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty 
of contributory negligence under this act is not 
a bar to recovery but the damages shall be dimin-
ished by the jury in proportion to the amount 
of negligence attributable to the plaintiff.'' 
Other instructions bearing on the duty owed by 
defendent to its employees and given by the court are 
set forth herein. Instruction No. 4 reads in part as fol-
lows: 
"You are inst,..-,wted that the defend(]Jftt is WO't 
an insure;r .of the safety of the plaintiff or any 
of its employees. The mere fact that plaintiff was 
injured while in the performance of his duties 
does not, standing alone, entitle him to recover. 
The rplaintiff in .order to reaover must prove b,y 
a preponderarnce of the evidence that the defend-
ant was negligent as charged in the complaint 
and that such negligence was a proximate cause 
of his injuries, if any.'' 
* * * * 
''Negligence on the part of anyone is not to 
be inferred from the fact that an accident may 
have occurred. The happening of an accident, if 
any, and the resulting injury to the plaintiff, if 
any, are not evidence of negligence on the part 
of the defendant, nor evidence of contributory 
negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Accidents 
may happen without any negligence existing on 
the part of either party. Negligence, if any, and 
contributory negligence, if any, must be proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence in this case.'' 
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Again in Instruction No. 7 the Court states that: 
'' 'Negligence' is the failure to do what a rea-
sonably prudent person would ordinarily have 
done under the circumstances of the situation, 
or doing what such person under such existing 
circumstances would not have done. The essence 
of the fault may lie in acting or omitting to act. 
The duty is dictated and measured by the exigen-
cies of the occasion.'' 
* * * * 
Instruction No. 9 reads in part as follows : 
''In an action for personal injuries under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act, caused in 
\'I 
P\ 
whole or im part by negligence :of the carrier, the lnil 
injured person is entitled to recover full compen-
sation for all damages pnoximately resultfing f'nom 
such neglig·ence, even though such injuries may 
have been aggravated by reason of his pre-exiSf. 
ing physical condition, or might not even have 
occurred had it not been for such previously 
existing physical condition.'' 
* * * * 
Instruction No. 10 reads in part as follows: 
'' * * * but it is sufficient to allow recovery in 
favor of plaintiff if the negligence, if ~arvy, of 
t:he defendant proximately eraused, in whole or 
In 
in rpa.rt, a strain which resulted in an incisional ;'f\!n 
hernia suffered by the plaintiff.'' t1e 
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Instruction No. 12 reads in part as follows: 
''Before yon can find in favor of the plaintiff 
you must be satisfied, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, * * * 
( 1) That the defendant failed to use ordinary 
care in keeping the inside cross-switch 
clean and free from congestion; 
* * * * 
( 3) That an employer of ordinary intelli-
gence and prudence could have foreseen 
that injury to a person throwing said 
switch might likely follow from defend-
ant's failure, if any, to use ordinary care 
* * ... " 
Instruction No. 13 reads in part as follows : 
''The Court charges you that if you believe 
from the evidence that the injuries sustained by 
the plaintiff happened to him by a mere accident, 
without negligence on the part of the defendant, 
* * * then your verdict must be in favor of the 
defendant and against the plaintiff, 'no cause of 
action.' '' 
In their arguments to the jury there was no intima-
tion by counsel for either side that plaintiff could re-
cover except on the basis of established negligence on 
the part of the defendant. 
The Court committed a grammatical error by in-
serting the word ''and'' in Instruction No. 3, and yet, 
in 'the light of the instructions as a whole, and Instruction 
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No. 3 in particular, it is inconceivable that the jury could 
have been misled into believing that plaintiff could pre-
vail without proving negligence on the part of the de-
fendent. 
Prejudice from giving of an instruction will never 
be presumed, but on the contrary it is the responsibility 
of the complaining party to demonstrate that prejudice 
resulted from said instruction. Stat.e v. McCarty ·et al., 
104 Kan. 301, 179 P. 309. 
Defendant boldly states that the jury was told that 
defendant was an insurer of the safety of its employees 
while on duty and yet, at defendant's request, the Court 
specifically and clearly in Instruction No. 4 stated that 
defendant is not an insurer of the safety of plaintiff or 
any of its employees, and that plaintiff, in order to 
recover, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that defendant was negligent as charged in the complaint. 
POINT II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WAS NOT HYPOTHETICAL IN 
NATURE AND ACCURATELY STATED THE LAW OF THE 
CASE. 
Instruction No. 9 is herein set forth for the conven-
ience of the Court : 
''In an action for personal injuries under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act, caused in 
whole or in part by negligence of the carrier, the 
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injured person is entitled to recover full compen-
sation for all damages proximately resulting from 
such negligence, even though such injuries may 
have been aggravated by reason of his pre-exist-
ing physical condition, or n1ight not even have 
occurred had it not been for such previously 
existing physical condition. 
You are instructed ·that if you shall find and 
believe from a preponderance of the evidence that 
plaintiff in operating and attempting to operate 
and use the inside cross-over switch at Milford, 
Utah, did so in the usual, ordinary and customary 
manner, then you will not be warranted in finding 
him guilty of contributory negligence in this re-
gard, even though you shall find and believe that 
at the tim€ the plaintiff operated and attempted 
to operate and use this switch there was at ·that 
time a muscular weakness in his abdomen, due 
to the operation which he had undergone pre-
viously for the r€moval of the gall bladder.'' 
Defendant contends that there was no evidence of a 
usual, ordinary and customary method and manner of 
manipulating the switch and that Instruction No. 9 
is therefore erroneous in that, while it may state the 
law accurately, it is hypothetical in nature and not based 
on the evidence. 
The evidence fully revealed that the ordinary, usual 
and customary manner of manipulating the switch was 
by use of the hands and by use of whatever force and 
leverage could be brought to bear, depending on the in-
dividual manipulating the switch. \Vhether plaintiff con-
formed with the usual and customary manner of mani-
pulating the switch by shoving with one hand on the 
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handle of the switch and the other on the switch stand 
was a question which was properly presented to the 
jury for its consideration. 
The instruction, which the court gave, accurately 
stated the law of the case. :Defendant has stated in its 
brief that the manner in which plaintiff threw the switch 
was unusual. This was a question which was presented 
for the jury to determine. The plaintiff testified that 
the manner of his manipulating the switch was in no 
way a departure from the usual, ordinary and custo-
mary manner of manipulating switches, and witnesses 
Alvey Robinson and George Alexander Connell sup-
ported that testimony at R. 247, 252, 265, 266, 269 and 
270. 
There was no evidence that plaintiff operated the 
switch in an unusual or negligent manner, and the bur-
den of proving contributory negligence was on the de-
fendant. Having failed entirely to prove contributory 
negligence, how can defendant complain about error in 
submitting that issue to the jury~ 
The question arises as to what prejudice, if any, 
defendant could have suffered as a result of Instruction 
No. 9. Defendant contends that the question of contri-
butory negligence was improperly submitted to the jury 
and yet the jury determined that plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence and deducted $3,500.00 from the 
general verdict for such contributory negligence. There-
fore, regardless of any possible error that may be con-
tained in the instruction defendant could not have 
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been prejudiced in any 1nanner, shape or form whatso-
ever. 
In Thomps·on v. City of Bellingham, 112 Wash. 583, 
192 P. 952, 955, the court stated: 
''The last assignment complains of an in-
struction upon the subject of contributory negli-
gence, predicated upon conditions the appellant 
contends do not exist in the case. It is unneces-
sary to decide, among other reasons, because, if 
there was error, it was harmless, for the jury by 
its verdict was with the appellant in this respect.'' 
In nl orris r. Bloomgren, 127 Ohio St. 147, 187 N.E. 
2, 89 A.L.R. 831, 837, the court stated: 
"The plaintiff below cannot complain of pre-
judicial error in the refusal to get special charge 
No. 4, because he secured a verdict.'' 
In D'T"Ury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 58 S.W. (2d) 969, 
88 A.L.R. 917, 939, the court sta:ted: 
''These criticisms of the instructions are not 
matters of which the plaintiffs can complain. If 
they were errors, they were not prejudicial to the 
plaintiffs. The verdicts cured them. The jury 
found that the defendant was negligent, and the 
ins{ructions criticized by the plaintiffs could not 
have affected that finding.'' 
See also Thompson v. Town of Ft. Bnanch, (Ind.) 178 
N.E. 440, and 0'1~lall;y v. Eagan et. ·al .. , (Wyo.) 2 P. (2d) 
1063. 
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POINT III. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 IS A CORRECT STATEMENT 
OF THE LAW. 
Instruction No. 11 is set forth herein for the con-
venience of the court : 
''It was the duty of the defendant railroad 
company to keep this switch in such working con-
dition that an injury would not be likely to re-
sult from overexertion, to any employee throw-
ing said switch. 
"You are instructed that the plaintiff has 
not even alleged and does not claim that the de-
fendant was negligent in permitting the plaintiff 
to return to work after the operation undergone 
by the plaintiff in connection with his gall blad-
der; you are, therefore, instructed that you may 
not find the defendant guilty of negligence in per-
mitting the plaintiff to return to work on the date 
when he resumed his employment with the defend-
ant after such operation for his gall bladder. 
You are, therefore, specifically instructed that 
you may not return a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant for damages 
for the plaintiff's alleged incisional hernia based 
upon the fact that the defendant railroad com-
pany permitted the plaintiff to return to work 
after he had undergone said gall bladder opera-
tion.'' 
Defendant contends that the first paragraph of the 
instruction places upon the railroad company an ab-
solute duty to make the switch safe for any employee 
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required to manipulate said switch. It will be observed 
that the court in said instruction places upon defendant 
the duty only of keeping the switch in such working 
condition that an injury would not likely result from 
overexertion to any employee throwing it. A proper 
synonyn1 for the word "likely" is "probable". This 
language connotes foreseeability, that it was probable 
and foreseeable that an employee while manipulating 
said switch would overexert and thereby injure himself. 
We submit that if the railroad company kept its switch 
in such condition that it was likely or probable or fore-
seeable that any employee while throwing the switch 
would injure himself by overexertion, that such conduct 
on the part of the railroad company would constitute 
negligence as a matter of law. Defendant's contention 
that the instruction places upon the railroad company 
''an absolute mandate that such appliances must be 
kept safe" is erroneous as not taking into consideration 
the true meaning of the word "likely" as it is used in 
said instruction. 
In Stewart v. Baltimore & 0. R. Oo., 137 Fed. (2d) 
527 ( Cer. den. ) ________ , the following fact situation ap-
peared: Plaintiff's intestate was employed by defend-
ant as a hostler's helper. On the evening of October 30, 
1941 he suffered a coronary thrombosis which had re-
sulted from straining himself while attempting to throw 
a switch in the defendant's railroad yard. He died as a 
result of the coronary thrombosis. It was contended by 
defendant that the switch was not defective but only 
hard to move because it was new and stiff and that there-
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fore defendant was not guilty of negligence in furnishing 
for use of its employees the switch upon which decedent 
injured himself. From an order of the trial court grant-
ing defendant's motion for nonsuit, plaintiff appealed 
and the Second Circuit Court of A·ppeals, consisting of 
Justices L. Hand, Augustus N. Hand and Chase, Justice 
Chase dissenting, reversed in the following language: 
''The defendant seeks to juS'tify the dismissal 
of the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the 
switch was not really defective but only hard to 
move because new and stiff. But it should be ob-
served that the decedent threw three other 
switches without difficulty on the very evening 
he strained himself with the switch in question 
and that Edman did not need to use a bar in order 
to throw any of ·the other switches. There is no 
proof that the defendant had tested the switch 
after it was installed or had done anything to 
prevent its being used by an employee without 
undue exertion. In our opinion it was for the 
jury to say whether oper:a~ion of the switch in 
question was so likely to result in injury from 
over-exertion that a vrudent emplo·yer would not 
hav.e supplied it to his workJnen, but wot~rld .rather 
haV:e fur.nished a more easily turned appliance. 
There have been many decisions which have held 
that it is negligent to require a workman to move 
articles that are too heavy for him to lift without 
help. Albertz v. Bache, G. T., First Dept., 57 Hun 
592, 10 N.Y.S. 639; Bowman v. Kansas City Elec-
tric Light Co., Mo. App., 213 S.W. 161; Stewart 
Dry Goods Co. v. Boone, 175 Ky. 271, 194 S.W. 
103; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Langan, 116 Ky. 318, 
76 S.W. 32; Culver v. Union Pac. R. Co., 112 
Neb. 441, 444, 445, 199 N.W. 794; Hice v. Garrett, 
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Tex. CiY. App. 194 K,Y. 667; Bonn v. Galveston 
& S . ..:-\. R. Co., ~rex. CiY. App., 82 S.W. 808; Boyd 
v. Great Northern R. Co., 8-± ~Iont. 84, 27-± P. 293. 
It is true that in these cases recovery sometimes 
failed because of proved knowledge by the em-
ployee of the danger and involuntary assumption 
of the risk but, by the amendment of the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act in 1939, as amended 
by 53 Stat. 140±, Title 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 54, 'the 
doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated' 
as a defense to negligence on the part of the 
carrier and there was left 'for practical purposes 
only the question of whether the carrier was 
negligent and whether that negligence was the 
proximate cause of the injury.' Tiller v. Atlantic 
Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S. 54, 58, 66, 63 S. Ct. 
4-U, -1±6, 87 L. Ed .................. The decision of the Texas 
Court of Civil Appeals, in Hines v. Ross, 230 
S. W. 1066, relied on by the defendant, really 
turned on the question of assumption of risk and 
hence has no pertinency in view of the amend-
ment of 1939. The same thing may be said of 
the decision in Jirmasek v. Great Northern R. Co., 
151 Minn. 421, 186 N. W. 814. 
''Doubtless an employee cannot recover dam-
ages for every harm he may suffer through fail-
ure of his employer to provide him with the best 
sort of appliance unless the situation is such that 
the chance of injury can be reasonably foreseen. 
But where, as here, the likelihood of injury from 
the operation of a switch that was hard to turn 
cannot be said to have been beyond a reasonable 
apprehension the question whether the employer 
maintained a proper standard of care was for 
the jury. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 
U. S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed .................. Over-
exertion resulting in serious casualties is some-
thing which can as well be foreseen as many other 
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occurrences and is something which an employer 
may be thought bound to take all reasonable steps 
to prevent.'' 
It will be observed that the court in its opinion uses 
the exact language of the trial court in this case. '' * * * 
so likely to result in injuny from overexertion * * *" 
The court, in Instruction No. 11, did not endeavor 
to set forth the requirements of proof before plaintiff 
could recover but merely related the duty which was 
owed, in connection with another subject, to wit: that 
defendant was not negligent in permitting plaintiff to 
return to work too soon after the operation for removal 
of his gall bladder. 
Instruction No. 12, which follows immediately there-
after, sets forth the requirements of proof before plain-
tiff can recover in the following language: 
"Before you can find in favor of the plaintiff 
you must be satisfied, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that each and all of the following pro-
positions are true: 
(1) That the defendant failed to use ordin-
ary care in keeping the inside cross-
switch clean and free from congestion; 
(2) That plaintiff's incisional hernia was a 
natural and probable result of the fail-
ure if any, on the part of the defendant 
to keep said switch uncongested; 
(3) That an employer of ordinary intelli-
gence and prudence could have foreseen 
that injury to a person throwing said 
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switch might likely follow from defend-
ant's failure, if any, to use ordinary care 
in respect to keeping the said switch free 
from congestion.'' 
It will be observed the jury is clearly instructed 
that before plaintiff can recover it must appear by a 
preponderance of the evidence that defendant tailed to 
use o rd ina ry care in keeping the switch clean and free 
from congestion, and further required that defendant, 
as an ordinary prudent employer, oould have foreseen 
that injury might likely result from its negligence in the . 
manner of keepi;ng the switch. It is clear from the in-
struction set forth that defendant's contention "that 
Instruction No. 11 informs the jury that the railroad 
company has an absolute duty to make the switch safe" 
is absolutely contrary to the instructions which the court 
actually gave, contrary to the court's decision in the 
Stewart case. 
Blair v. Baltimo,re & 0. R. Oo., 323 U.S. 600, 65 S. Ct. 
545, 548. In this case the plaintiff incurred an injury 
while engaged in unloading a freight car containing 
30 foot steel tubes, weighing approximately 1,000 pounds, 
by using a 5-foot nose truck about 2 feet high. The 
evidence revealed that the tube slipped and plaintiff's 
helpers released their holds; that the truck kicked back 
against the plaintiff and thereby caused the injuries com-
plained of. The court clearly held that plaintiff had no 
duty to cease work rather than assume the burden of 
lifting a heavy object with inadequate tools and insuffi-
cient help. The court stated: 
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''"" * • We cannot say as a matter of law that the 
railroad complied with its duties in a reasonablv 
careful manner under the circumstances her~ 
' nor that the conduct which the jury might have 
found to be negligent did not contribute to peti-
tioner's injury 'in whole or in part.' Conse-
quently . we think the jury, and not the court 
should finally determine these issues. 
'''The court below, however, thought that the 
plaintiff should not recover because he had as-
sumed the risk of this danger. It is to be noted 
that at the time this case was tried Congress had 
passed an act which completely abolished the 
defense of assumption of risk. 53 Stat. 1404, 45 
U.S.C.A. Sec. 54. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast LineR. 
Co., supra. We need not consider whether this 
statute applies to this case, since we are of opin-
ion that it cannot be held as a matter of law 
that the petitioner assumed the risks incident to 
moving the steel tubes.'' 
The second contention made by defendant in at-
tacking the portion of the instruction herein set forth is, 
' 'all that is required is that the switch be placed in such 
condition as would be reasonably safe for an employee 
using the same with reason.able oare for his own s:afety.'' 
This contention fails to take into account the situation 
where a switch is kept in such an unsafe condition that 
any employee using it would likely be injured by over-
exertion, and that an employee using such a negligently 
kept switch was himself negligent in the way in which 
he manipulated the switch. Of course, under such cir-
cumstances contributory negligence of an employee could 
not under the Federal Employers' Liability Act consti-
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tute a complete and absolute bar to recovery. Defendant 
is endeavoring by this argument to revive and revitalize 
the now defunct defenses of contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk. Contributory negligence was abol-
ished as a defense under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act in the year 1908, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 53. Its bed-
fellow, assumption of risk, was abolished in all of its 
aspects in the year 1939, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 54. The inten-
tion of Congress in abolishing these defenses is clear. 
Comparative negligence has replaced common law prin-
ciples in this important field of law. 
In G.rand Trwnk Western Railway Co. v. Lindsay, 
233 U.S. 42, 34 S. Ct. 581, 583, it appeared that the plain-
tiff, who was a switchman, had gone between two cars 
where the couplers had failed to couple on impact after 
several attempts had been made; that he gave a ''go 
ahead" signal before going between the cars and that 
his arm was crushed when the cars came together by 
virtue of the impact. 
Among the errors assigned in the intermediate ap-
pellate court was the refusal of the trial court to give an 
instruction relating to the action of the switchman in 
entering between the cars and his supposed giving of the 
"come ahead" signal. This instruction, while leaving 
to the jury the determination of whether the switchman 
in going between the cars to examine the coupler mechan-
ism gave a ''come ahead'' signal, nevertheless asked the 
court to instruct as a matter of law that if he had done 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
so his act was the proximate cause of his injuries and 
therefore he could not recover. 
The court discussed contributory negligence as a 
possible bar to recovery, and supported the trial court 
in refusing the requested instruction in the following 
language: 
"* * * But having regard to the state of the proof 
as to the defect in the coupling mechanism, its 
failure to automatically work by impact after 
several efforts to bring about that result, all of 
which preceded the act of the switchman in going 
between the cars, in the view most favorable to the 
railroad, the case was one of concurring negli-
gence ; that is, was one where the injury com-
plained of was caused both by the failure of the 
railway company to comply with the safety appli-
ance act and by the contributing negligence of the 
switchman in going between the cars. Under this 
condition of things it is manifest that the charge 
of the court was greatly more favorable to the 
defendant company than was authorized by the 
statute for the following reasons: Although by 
the 3rd section of the employers' liability act a 
recovery is not prevented in a case of contribu-
tory negligence, since the statute substitutes for 
it a system of comparative negligence, whereby 
the damages are to be diminished in the propor-
tion which his negligence bears to the combined 
negligence of himself and the carrier,-in other 
words, the carrier is to be exonerated from a pro-
portional part of the damages corresponding to 
the amount of negligence attributable to the em-
ployee (Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U. S. 
114, 122, 57 L. Ed. 1096, 1101, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
654) ,-nevertheless, under the tenns of a proviso 
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to the section, contributory negligence on the part 
of the employee does not operate even to dimin-
ish the recovery where the injury has been oc-
casioned in part by the failure of the carrier to 
comply "ith the exactions of an act of Congress 
enacted to promote the safety of employees. In 
that contingency the statute abolishes the de-
fense of contributory negligence, not only as a 
bar to recovery, but for all purposes." 
In TliUer L Atlantic Coast Line R. Oo., 318 U. S. 54, 
63 S. Ct. ill, 87 L. Ed. 610, 323 U.S. 574, 65 S. Ct. 421, 
89 L. Ed. 465, Justice Black, speaking for the court, 
stated: 
''If this were not sufficiently clear from the 
language of the amendment, any doubt would be 
dissipated by its legislative history. The 1939 
bill was introduced by Senator Neely and was 
supported at the hearings by the railway labor 
unions. It was accepted both by the unions and 
the railroads that the bill would utterly and com-
pletely abolish the defense of assumption of risk. 
The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
struck at the basic reasons advanced by common 
law courts for the existence of the doctrine, de-
clared it unsuited to present day activities, and 
described them as out of harmony with the equit-
able principles which should govern determina-
tions of employer-employee responsibilities. The 
bill, as described in the report, was clearly aimed 
at making the principles of comparative negli-
gence the guiding rules of decision in accident 
cases: ''The adoption of this proposed amend-
ment will, in cases in which no recovery is now 
allowed, establish the principle of comparative 
negligence, which permits the jury to weigh the 
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fault of the injured employee and compare it 
with the negligence of the employer, and in the 
light of the comparison, do justice to ~ll con-
cerned.''' 
* * * * 
''No case is to be witheld from a jury on any 
theory of assumption of risk and questions of 
negligence should under proper charge from the 
court be submitted to the jury for their deter-
mination. l\1:any years ago this Court said of 
the problems of negligence, 'We see no reason, 
so long as the jury system is the law of the land, 
and the jury is made the tribunal to decide dis-
puted questions of fact, why it should not decide 
such questions as these as well as others.' Jones 
v. Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co., 128 U. S. 443, 445, 
32 L. Ed. 478, 479. Or as we have put it on 
another occasion, 'Where the facts are in dis-
pute, and the evidence in relation to them is that 
from which fair-minded men may draw different 
inferences,' the case should go to the jury.'' 
Since the Lindsay case the Supreme Court of the 
United States has consistently supported and upheld 
the doctrine of comparative negligence under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act, and since the 1939 amend-
ment both contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk in all of their various aspects and under whatever 
name applied, he it sole proximate cause or non-negli-
gence, has been denied recognition. 
Garay, Ancillary Admr. ,of the Esbat·e of William 
Frank Lucus, Dec'd v. 8outhern Bac. Co. Decided Jan. 
3, 1949, 17 L. W. 4089, 4090, 335 U. S. --------· In this case 
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decedent's death occurred when a one-man flat-top motor-
car crashed into the back end of an 82-car freight train 
on a main line track at a point near Lamay, Utah. The 
train had stopped on the main line as a result of a 
Safety Appliance Act violation. It was successfully 
contended in the trial court and in the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah by defendant that the unexpected 
stopping of the train as a result of the Safety Appliance 
Act violation was not a proximate cause of decedent's 
death; that decedent's contributory negligence was the 
sole proximate cause of his own death. The Supreme 
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, stated: 
''The language selected by Congress to fix 
liability in cases of this kind is simple and direct. 
Consideration of its meaning by the introduction 
of dialectical subtleties can serve no useful inter-
pretative purpose. The statute declares that rail-
roads shall be responsible for their employees' 
deaths 'resulting in whole or in part' from de-
fective appliances such as were here maintained. 
-!5 U.S.C. 51. And to make its purpose crystal 
clear, Congress has also provided that 'no such 
employee ... shall be held to have been guilty of 
contributory negligence in any case' where a 
violation of the Safety Appliance Act, such as 
the one here, 'contributed to the ... death of 
such employee.' 45 U.S.C. 53. Congress has thus 
for its own reasons imposed extraordinary safety 
obligations upon railroads and has commanded 
that if a breach of these obligations contributes in 
part to an employee's death, the railroad must 
pay damages. These air-brakes were defective; 
for this reason alone the train suddenly and un-
expectedly stopped; a motor track car following 
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at about the same rate of speed and operated 
by an employee looking in another direction 
crashed in to the train; all of these circumstances 
were inseparably related to one another in time 
and space. The jury could have found that de-
cedent's death resulted from any or all of the 
foregoing circumstances.'' 
In the case of Clyde VVlilkerson v. Wilson McCarl!hy 
et ~al, decided Jan. 31, 1949, 17 L. W. 4175, 4178, (not yet 
reported), a railroad switchman was injured when he 
slipped on a narrow boardwalk across a wheel-pit. The 
defendant endeavored again to revive the defense of 
contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery, 
again arguing that the sole proximate cause of plain-
tiff's injuries was his own neglect in choosing to walk 
~s the boardwalk when another and safer means was 
available to him. The United States Supreme Court 
stated: 
"There was, as the state court pointed out, 
evidence to show that petitioner could have taken 
a slightly longer route and walked around the pit, 
thus avoiding the use of the board. This fact, 
however, under the terms of the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act, would not completely im-
munize the respondents from liability if the in-
jury was 'in part' the result of respondents' negli-
gence. For while petitioner's failure to use a 
safer method of crossing might be found by the 
jury to be contributory negligence, the Act pro-
vides that 'contributory negligence shall not bar 
a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished 
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by the jury in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to such employee .... ' '' 
In the case at bar defendant is endeavoring to re-
vive contributory negligence as a defense by associating 
two entirely separate and distinct problems into one. 
"\Yhat the defendant here seeks to do is to require 
that plaintiff be free of contributory negligence before 
there can be a finding of negligence on the part of defend-
ant. In other words, under this contention contributory 
negligence would again be a complete defense to an 
action under the F.E.L.A. In the Tille.r case defendant 
sought to have assumption of risk by plaintiff play a 
part in the determination of whether or not the defend-
ant was negligent and the court rejected such conten-
tion in no uncertain terms. In the I/imdsay, Oo11ay and 
WilkerSion cases defendant asked that the defense of con-
tributory negligence be resurrected under the name of 
proximate cause and this was also summarily rejected. 
We submit that the defendant's contention in the case 
at bar should be rejected as an attempt to engraft upon 
the F.E.L.A. the defense of contributory negligence 1n 
direct violation of the clear terms of the Act. 
Defendant is again endeavoring by introduction of 
''dialectical subtleties'' to confuse a proper interpreta-
tion of the Federal Employers' Liability Act which pro-
vides for apportionment of negligence among the acting 
parties. 
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POINT IV. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16 IS A CORRECT AND ACCURATE 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND DID NOT PREJUDICE 
DEFENDANT IN ANY MANNER WHATSOEVER. 
Instruction No. 16 is challenged by the defendant 
in regard to those portions which read as follows: 
'' * * * In determining the amount of such 
damages, you are instructed that plaintiff is en-
titled to compensation for ·all pain and suffering, 
if any, both mental and physical, which he has en-
dured since the time he sustained his injuries and 
that he will prob1ably endure in the futur·e; in de-
termining con1pensation for pain and suffering, 
if any, yon may take into consideration its dura-
tion and its severity. The law furnishes no way 
by which to measure what is reasonable compen-
sation for mental and physical pain and suffer-
ing, but it is left to the sound judgment and dis-
cretion of the jury trying the case to determine 
from a preponderence of the evidence what is 
reasonable compensation to compensate the plain-
tiff for any physical or mental pain and suffering 
he has endur:ed or will probably endure in the 
futur:e. 
You are further instructed that you may 
take into consideration loss of bodily function, 
if any, which !Plaintiff has suffe.red or which plain-
tiff will probably suffer in the future." 
There are two questions which must be decided in 
analyzing the foregoing instruction. 'The first is, whether 
or not the instruction is a correct statement of the law. 
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The seeond is, whether the instruction, assuming it to 
be a correct statement of the law, in any way prejudiced 
the defendant under the evidence of this case. 
(a) Instruction No. 16 is a correct and accurate 
statement of the law. 
Defendant apparently takes issue with the rule 
of law as set forth in Instruction No. 16 when he 
cites such cases as Jensen v. Omaha & Council Bluffs 
St. Ry. Co., 257 X. \Y. 257 and Missouri Pac. Tramsporta-
tion Co. r. Kinney, 135 S. \V. (2d) 56. These cases ap-
parently adopt the narrow and restricted viewpoint that 
there is a substantial difference between ''reasonable 
certainly" and "probable". We assume defendant cites 
these cases with the view in mind of prevailing on this 
court to overrule and abrogate the principles set forth 
by this court in Picino v. Utah-Apex Mining Oo., 52 Utah 
338, 173 P. 900, and by the United States Supreme Court 
in interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Carnahan, 241 U. S. 241, 
36 S. Ct. 594, 595. It is beyond dispute that this court is 
bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court where the Federal Employers' Liability Act is 
involved. See Sullivan v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 258 
N. W. 38. In the Carnahan case the following instruC-
tion was challenged : 
'' 'The court instructs the jury that if they 
believe from a preponde11ance of the ·evidence 
that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff in this 
action, then in assessing damages against the 
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defendant, they may take into consideration the 
pain and suffering of the plaintiff, his mental 
anguish, the bodily injury sustained by him his 
pecuniary loss, his loss of power and capacit; for 
work and its effect upon his future, not however 
in excess of $35,000, as to them may seem just and 
fair.' ( .... Va ..... , 84 S.E. 863.)" 
Defendant contested the instruction on the ground 
that it allowed the jury to speculate on future pain and 
suffering that was remote, and contended that only such 
future damages could be recovered as were reasonably 
certain. The Supreme Court of the United States dis-
cussed the lower court's dicision and in supporting the 
instruction, stated: 
''The supreme court expressed the view that 
the speculation of future results which the rail-
way company professed to apprehend was not 
left by the instruction for the jury to indulge, nor 
did the instruction commit the amount of damages 
to the conjecture of the jury independently of the 
evidence in the case. The contention made here 
was explicitely rejected, viz., that the instruction 
pern1itted the jury to tal:ce into consideration the 
'possible future physical effects from the injury, 
such as future suffering in the absence of evi-
dence as to the probability of such.' The court 
remarked that it would be a strained construction 
of the language of the instruction 'to hold that it 
referred to future suffering, and that damages 
not the proximate result of the injuries received 
were included under' it, and that, besides, such 
conclusion was precluded by an instruction given 
at the request of the railway company, which was 
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'that in order for the plain~i.ff to recover in this 
case he must pro~' e by a pre po nde.r.anc.e of the 
eride-nce that the injut·ies he sustained were the 
di.rect and pron~ma.te rest~lt of the neglig-ence of 
the a efen:dant. ,• 
' 'The con1n1ent of the court is accurate and 
we can add nothing to it. The principle is es-
tablished that when the evidence in a case shows 
that there will be future effects from an injury, 
an instruction 1clz ich justifies ·an ifnclus1von of them 
in an a.u·ard of damages is not error. Washington 
& G. R. Co. v. Harmon (Washington & G. R. Co. 
v. Tobriner), 147 U.S. 571, 37 L. Ed. 284, 13 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 557; McDermott v. Severe, 202 U. S. 
600, 50 L. Ed. 1162, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709. 
"It is also objected that the instruction 'al-
lowed the jury to indulge in speculation and con-
jecture; invited their attention to the sum of 
$35,000, and allowed the jury to give such sum 
as damages as to them might 'seem just and fair' 
without stating that the damages could be only 
such as were proved by the evidence to have 
proximately resulted from the negligent act com-
plained of.'' 
''The objection is untenable. As we have seen, 
the court explicitely enjoined upon the jury that 
there must be .a proximate 0/Y/}d caus;al relation 
between the damages and the negligence of the 
company, and the reference to the sum of $35,000 
was a limitation of the amount stated in the de-
claration. There could have been no misunder-
standing of the purpose of the instruction. Nor-
folk & W. R. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U. S. 114, 119, 
58 L. Ed. 1096, 1100, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654, Ann. 
Cas. 1914C, 172." 
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It will be observed that the United States Supreme 
Court found that the jury need only find future pain 
and suffering, if any, from a "preponderance of the 
evidence'' and expressly renounces any requirement of 
reasonable certainty in determining damages for future 
pain and suffering. 
In the Picilno case this court, speaking through Judge 
Thurman, considered the following instruction: 
" 'If, under the 'evidence and the instructions 
given you by the court, your verdict is in favor of 
the plaintiff, you will assess his damages, and in 
doing so you have the right and should take into 
consideration his age and his earning capacity, 
before and after the injury, the nature and extent 
of his injury, and whether permanent or not, the 
physical pain and mental anguish suffered and 
endured and that he will probably hereafter en-
dure by reason and on account of said injury, the 
time lost and that he will probably hereafter lose, 
as n1ay appear from the evidence, by reason of 
and as a direct result of such injury, such ex-
pense, if any, as he will hereafter incur in the 
treatment of the injury, together with all the 
facts and circumstances in evidence in the case, 
and after doing so you will assess the damages at 
such sum as from the evidence you may deem pro-
per, not exceeding the amount claimed by plain-
tiff in his complaint.' " 
The court held that there was no substantial difference 
between the words ''probable'' and ''reasonably cer-
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tain", and cited with approval the law as set down in 
8 Ruling Ca.se Laze (~t page 5-1-1, wherein it is stated: 
'' ·It is a well-settled general rule that, in as-
sessing the ainount of damages in an action for 
a personal injury, the jury 1nay make an allow-
ance for the pain and suffering which the person 
injured is reasonably certain to undergo in the 
future in consequence of the injury, including 
also an allowance for mental suffering. Pain and 
suffering which are merely possible and specula-
tive are, of course, not to be considered. All that 
is required under this rule is that there be suffi-
cient evidence from which the jury m,ay fairly 
deri.ve the conclusio.n :that the chanoes that the 
plaimtijf wiU end!ure future :p-ain and sufferitng 
preponderate oven- those that he will not. Such 
prepondero;nce denotes probabWity or lik,elihood, 
a.nd that is sufficient.' " 
The same principles as set forth in the foregoing 
cases are clearly discus·sed in the following cases: Cop-
pinger et al v. B11oderick et al, (Ariz. Dec. 1931), 295 Pac. 
780; GaUamore v. City of Olympia, 34 Wash. 379, 75 P. 
978; Harris v. Brown's B1ay Logging Co., 57 Wash. 8, 
106 P. 152. 
It is clear from the foregoing authorities that the 
United States Supreme Court in interpreting the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act and the Utah Supreme 
Court have expressly denounced those conservative juris-
dictions which have adopte~ the rule of law that future 
!If pain and suffering must be proved with ''reasonable 
certainty" and have held that future pain and suffer-
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ing when established by a ''preponderance of the evi-
dence" or when "probable" is compensable. 
(b) Instruction No. 16 did not in any way pre-
judice the defendant. 
Defendant, in its brief at page 26, states: 
'' * * * Not one word in all the evidence at the 
trial indicated that Duffy was suffering pain or 
that he had been suffering pain from his injuries 
for more than one year prior to the trial. Not one 
word of testimony indicated that Duffy's bodily 
function had been impaired by his injuries or that 
it was probable or likely that his bodily function 
would be impaired by his injuries, * * * '' 
We take serious issue with defendant on this proposition. 
Approximately three months proir to his accident 
and injuries the plaintiff had undergone a serious ma-
jor operation for removal of his gall bladder. This had 
necessitated the making of an incision approximately 10 
inches in length down the center of his stomach and the 
retraction of the stomach, dissection and ligation of the 
blood vessels in that portion of his anatomy, and after 
the operation the sewing up of the various fascia of 
the stomach. It was necessary for a drain to be placed 
in the wound which remained therein for some time after 
the operation. Unless an individual has actually under-
gone a serious operation of this nature it is .doubtful 
whether he would understand or fully appreciate the 
amount of mental pain and anguish and worry associated 
with such an operation. After plaintiff had discovered 
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the incisional hernia and knew that the operation had 
to be repeated, that another incision had to be 1nade and 
the various fascia or layers of fat, muscles and tissues 
of the stomach resewn, the jury, relying upon its own 
fund of knowledge and human experience, as it had a 
perfect right, and in fact, a duty to do, found the plain-
tiff underwent extreme mental pain and suffering in an-
ticipation of the operation. 
Dr. Rees H. Anderson's testimony will be recalled 
wherein he stated that an operation was not immediately 
performed upon the plaintiff for reduction of the in-
cisional hernia because ''I don't think that he was par-
ticularly prepared to undergo another operation, men-
tally, at that particular time." (R. 188). 
After the second operation was performed there is 
no question but that the plaintiff continued to suffer 
from mental pain and anguish, worry and consternation 
over whether or not this tearing apart in the area of his 
previous operation which had occurred once might oe-
cur again. Dr. Rees Anderson testified that "in any her-
nia the tendency to recur is considerable.'' And again : 
'' Q. What, in your opinion, might cause a re-
currence in his case~ . 
A. I believe the poor tissue, the poor fascia, 
the improper healing.'' (R. 194). 
This testimony of the doctor establishes that one of the 
results of the hernia suffered by plaintiff was that his 
body had been so weakened that a tendency toward re-
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currence of that injury. was considerable. This was tes-
timony that a jury could take into consideration, and 
determine therer'rom that the effects of the injuries suf-
fered by plaintiff would extend into the future. 
In the face of this evidence would this court have 
sustained an instruction that there was no evidence of 
any future ill effects which could result from the her-
nia suffered by plaintiff and that therefore the jury 
could not consider any future damages from such injury 
because plaintiff's body was as good now as it was be-
fore the hernia? 
The mere statement of this demonstrates that de-
fendant's contentions fly directly in the face not only 
of this medical testimony, but also the common experi-
ence of mankind. Where once there has been a hernia 
the tendency to a recurrence is considerable. 
This very tendency to a recurrence also lays the 
basis for compensable mental suffering in the future. 
From this testimony, and by calling upon their own com-
mon experience, a jury could reasonably find that 
the plaintiff would in the future experience mental 
suffering in the form of worry on his part as he 
goes about his daily tasks in fearing that this hernia 
may recur. The occupation of the plaintiff is that 
of a switchman which requires the throwing of switches, 
then climbing on and off cars and other ·physical 
activities which distinctly call for physical exertion 
which may in the future cause the contemplated 
recurrence of the hernia. We submit that this fear of 
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injury to a weak body through these f'Xf'rtions will be 
present with plaintiff for a considerable time in the 
future. 
\Ye believe that a jury, viewing the nature of the 
two operations that had been performed on the plain-
tiff could well find that plaintiff would go through life 
always guarding against a recurrence of an incisional 
hernia. The worry and consternation over this condi-
tion could well cause not only mental pain and anguish, 
but physical pain and suffering as well. 
\Y e believe it is impossible to separate and segre-
gate actual physical pain and anguish from the various 
types of mental pain and suffering. It is doubtful if 
there is such a thing as mental pain and anguish which 
does not carry with it physical discomfort. Many peo-
ple within our common experience have been hospital-
ized, subjected to long periods of treatment and care 
for their physical condition which has resulted from 
mental strain and worry. That these elements of pain 
are inseparable and incapable of severance, one from 
the other, has been recognized by many courts. 
In Merrill v. Los .A.ngeles Gas & Electric Co., 158 
Cal. 499, 111 Pac. 534, 540, the court discussed in con-
siderable detail the impossibility as a practical matter 
of separating and segregating the various types of pain 
and anguish, both mental and physical. 
''Upon rna ture consideration of these and 
other cases, we express the views : First, that the 
grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, and humilia-
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tion which one suffers by reason of physical in-
juries are component parts of the 'mental suf-
fering' for which, admittedly, damages may be 
awarded. If this be not so, then 'mental suffering' 
is a meaningless phrase, and, when the laws say 
that recovery may be had for physical pain and 
mental suffering, it means only that recovery 
may be had for physical pain. Second, we think 
that the question is largely of academic, and to a 
very trifling extent, of practical, importance, 
since always and inevitably and against any in-
struction which a court may present the jury will 
take into consideration these very elements of 
mental suffering. Physical pain is a meaningless 
phrase if it is sought to dissociate it from men-
tal suffering. Physical pain is but one of many 
forms of mental suffering. If the law contem-
plated an award of damages solely for physical 
pain, it is meaningless to say that recovery may 
also be had for mental suffering. It is equally 
meaningless to say that the mental suffering must 
be that occasioned by the physical pain, for then 
the latter phrase would alone be sufficient to 
convey the full meaning of the law. Therefore, 
when the law says that a recovery may be had for 
mental suffering, it means a recovery for some-
thing more than that form of mental suffering 
described as physical pain. What more does it 
mean~ To mean anything it must include the 
numerous forms and phases which mental suf-
fering may take, which will vary in every case 
with the nervous temperament of the individual, 
his ability to stand shock, his financial condi-
tion in life, whether dependent upon his own 
labor or not, the nature of his injuries, whether 
permanent or temporary, disfiguring and humili-
ating, and so through a long category, the enum-
eration of which it is unnecessary here even to 
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atten1pt. \Yorry and anxiety oyer the future of 
his fan1ily would be a great elernent of mental 
suffering to a n1an dependent upon his own 
exertions for his and their support. It would not 
constitute any elernent of suffering to a man of 
abundant n1eans and "~ealth, identically injured. 
~-\.. wmnan's mental suffering ·would be much 
increased by knowledge of facial disfigurements 
-a man's naturally not so much so. Shall 
a jury be not permitted to consider these mat-
ters in estimating mental suffering, and is it an 
answer to say that they are too remote or 'too 
delicate to be weighed by any scales which the 
law has yet invented~' They are not remote. They 
are direct and consequential. 'They differ in de-
gree with individuals, with their sex, circum-
stances, and positions in life. But so do men 
differ in sensing physical pain; so do they differ 
in the mental suffering occasioned by physical 
pain alone. No one 'would pretend to say that 
the actual physical suffering of a crushed leg 
is the same in the case of a sodden, phlegmatic 
tramp as it would be with a high-strung, ner-
vous, active man of affairs. Yet the law has 
scales by which it measures the compensation for 
suffering of this kind, and measures it, of course, 
in terms of money. Why should it be supposed 
that those scales would break down and prove in-
adequate when other legitimate elements of men-
tal suffering are cast into their balance~ In truth 
the admeasurement of suffering in terms of 
money is a most clumsy device; but it is the best 
device which the law knows, and it is a device 
which the law will employ until some better is 
discovered. To forbid the consideration of these 
other elements of mental suffering, because the 
scales are not sufficiently delicate for their ad-
measurement, is equally to condemn the use of 
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the scales, in the very cases and for the very pur-
poses now admittedly sanctioned by the law. 
"We think, therefore, that Inental worry, dis-
tress, grief, mortification, where they are shown 
to exist, are properly component elements of that 
mental suffering for which the law entitles the 
injured party to redress in monetary damages. 
''But, as we have said, we think the whole 
matter possesses more academic than practical 
significance. Conceive the case of a plaintiff be-
fore a jury with a face shockingly mutilated and 
distorted. He testifies that he endured menta] 
suffering caused by his injuries. He is asked of 
what the mental suffering consists. He replies, 
physical pain, anxiety for fear his injuries may 
proves so permanent and disabling as to render 
him incapable of supporting his family, grief as he 
reviews the whole situation lest his disfigurement 
may humiliate him and make him an object of 
ridicule to his fellows. At the suggestion of de-
fendant's counsel, the jury is instructed to dis-
regard all the elements of mental suffering ex-
cepting that arising solely from the physical pain. 
Can the jury do it~ Will the jury do it~ It is mere 
self-stultification to believe that it will do other 
than to make up its verdict under the rule which, 
while not one at law, is one of well-nigh universal 
human conduct the rule of, 'Put yourself in his 
place.' Each juror will consider how he would 
feel under like circumstances, and he will not 
narrow his contemplation to the mere matter of 
physical suffering under the direction of any 
court. So that in fact verdicts always have and 
always will be rendered from this point of view." 
In Sears, Roebu,ck & Oo. v. Hartley, ( C.C.A. 9, dec. 
Apr. 3, 1947), 160 Fed. (2d) 1019, there was evidence of 
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two months severe pain suffered by appellee ending 
about six months before the trial and evidence of a feel-
ing in his ear like a fly. bothering him up to six weeks 
before the trial, and that his wife noticed a big differ-
ence in his hearing after the accident. There was also 
evidence that the memory of his past pain caused ap-
pellee to cry on the witness stand ·while telling his story 
to the jury. Appellant cmnplained of a portion of an 
instruction to the jury which read as follows: 
··Such sum as the jury shall award the 
plaintiff by reason of the physical pain, if any, 
which he has suffered by reason of his said in-
juries, if any, or which he is reasonably certain 
to suffer in the future therefrom, if any.'' 
Contention was made that said instruction allowed the 
jury to speculate on future pain and suffering when 
there was no evidence from which they could find such 
pain and suffering to exist. The court, in approving the 
instruction, stated: 
''The jury well could infer that though 
caused by mental anguish at the memory of his 
pain and the increased los·s of hearing, the phy-
sical act of crying is painful and that it was rea-
sonably certain to occur again in the future. The 
physical condition of appellee was evidence before 
the jury, not before us. It is not for tlUis court to 
replace its inference.s for that of the jury. The lat-
ter under the California law, and fundamentally, 
is allowed a 'wide latitude' and 'elastic discre-
tion' in its deliberations. Taylor v. Pole, 16 Cal. 
2d 668, 672-673, 107 p. 2d 614.'' 
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Courts have instructed juries to allow compensa-
tion for mental pain and suffering, if any, when ac-
companied by physical injuries even though there is no 
direct testimony regarding that element of damage ad~ 
duced at the trial. In Texas Utilities Co. v. Dear, 64 ~· W. 
(2d) 807, 814, the court stated: 
"In cases of this character, where it is shown 
that illness, nervousness, orr bodily pain has r'e-
sulted from the injuries oomplained, of, mental 
suffering will be implied. Turner v. McKinney 
(Tex. Civ. App.) 182 S. W. 431; Gulf, C. & S. F. 
Ry. Co. v. Levy, 59 Tex. 563, 46 Am. Rep. 278; 
Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Smith (Tex. Civ. 
App.) 197 S. W. 614, affirmed (Com. App.) 222 
S. W. 1099; and this case holds that, where the 
complaining party has been crippled or suffered 
physical injuries, the jury may take into con-
sideration anxiety and suffering from brooding 
over the resulbs of said injuries. The courts have 
frequently permitted the recovery of damages 
where mental suffering resulted from apprehen-
sion as to the complaining party's incapacity to 
support himself and his family. Citizens' Ry. Co. 
v. Branham ('Tex. Civ. App.) 137 S. W. 403; Ft. 
W., etc., Ry. Co. v. Turner (Tex. Civ. App.) 157 
S. W. 274; 13 Tex. Jur. 125." 
In Goldblatt Bros. Inc. L Parish (Ind.) 33 N. E. 
(2d) 835, it appeared that there was no evidence of men-
tal pain and suffering on the part of the infant plain-
tiff in connection with the loss of an arm. The trial court, 
however, instructed the jury on future mental pain and 
suffering. The appellate court supported the trial court's 
instruction and held that in appropriate cases a jury 
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can infer from the very nature of the injury, that there 
will be future mental pain and suffering. 
Smith v. Boston ct JJ. R. R. (N. H.) 177 Atl. 729, 
738. In this case the court holds that mental pain and 
suffering based on fear of paralysis, even though said 
fear is not based on future probabilities, is neverthe-
less an element of damage. The court stated: 
"The testimony of Miss Smith that by rea-
son of the injuries sustained in the accident she 
had a horror that her legs might be paralyzed 
was properly received. The fact of a fear so 
caused, if found by the jury, would be an element 
of damages for their consideration, even though 
the fear was mistaken. That the fear regarded a 
possibility rather than a probability would not 
alter the reality of the mental suffering, unless 
the jury found the fear so fantastic as to make 
them believe that it was not in fact entertained. 
,. * * * * 
'' * * * This is the not the case of an opin-
ion that n1iss Smith may suffer paralysis; it in-
volves the statement as matter of fact that she 
has been continuously suffering from the fear of 
that possibility. If found to exist as the result 
of the defendant's fault, such suffering would en-
title her to damages, and an instruction to the 
jury to disregard the apprehension would have 
been error. * * * '' 
In the case at bar, the happening of an incisional 
hernia after a serious operation and the chance of its 
recurrence are facts from which a jury could well draw 
the permissible inference that plaintiff would continue 
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to worry and remain concerned over whether there would 
be a recurrence. 
That juries are authorized to draw from their own 
experiences in life and from their general knowledge 
of human behavior in arriving at their verdicts was 
recognized by this Court in Schb(})Ue.r v. McOart'lii!J et al 
(Utah) 196 P. ( 2d) 968, 973, where it was stated: 
" * * * But after a careful consideration of the 
entire record, we have reached the conclusion 
that a jury, from the medical testimony taken to-
gether with the other evidence in the case, and 
particularly the testimony of plaintiff, and view-
ing it in the light of their knowledge and experi-
ence in life, could justifiably have found that 
plaintiff suffered a permanent and substantial 
impairment of earning capacity. * * * " 
In Western & A. R. R. v. Dobbs (Ga.) 137 S. E. 
407, 408, the court discussed an instruction which in-
cluded future pain and suffering as an element of dam-
age, and held that the instruction gave the jury its legal 
prerogative of viewing the evidence and allowing for 
only the damages legally flowing from the injuries sus-
tained. The court stated: 
"In a suit against a railroad company by a 
married woman, to recover damages because of 
the alleged negligent act of the defendant's flag-
man, causing her to be injured by coming in con-
tact with a lantern in his hands while she was at-
tempting to board a train of the defendant, a 
charge that, if the plaintiff is entitled to recover, 
she will be entitled to recover 'for the injury sus-
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tained~ and, as an eleinent of rproYery, would be 
included pain and suffering which she may have 
endured, or n1ay hereafter endure, because of the 
alleged injury,' is not an instruction that the 
plaintiff would be entitled to recover all the 
general and special damages resulting from the 
physical or bodily injuries inflicted upon her by 
the negligent act of the defendant, but is an in-
struction to the effect that, if she is entitled to 
recover, she is entitled to recover only the dam-
ages legally flowing from the injuries sustained, 
\YhateYer they might appear to be from the evi-
dence. Nor is the charge subject to the objection 
that-
" 'It authorized the jury to award the plain-
tiff damages on the mere imaginary possibility 
that she may or might endure such future pain 
and suffering because of the alleged injury, and 
further because said instructions failed to re-
quire that the jury should determine from the 
evidence whether there was or was not reasonable 
probability that plaintiff would or would not en-
dure future pain and suffering because of the 
alleged injury.' 
''The charge is an instruction to the effect 
that the plaintiff would be entitled to recover 
damages for whatever pain and suffering, whe-
ther past or future, it might appear from the evi-
dence she has endured, or may endure in the 
future.'' 
So too in the case at bar. The instruction did not 
invite the jury to allow damages that were nonexistent 
or that were not demonstrated by the evidence but stated 
the law and allowed the jury its prerogative of viewing 
all of the evidence and allowing recovery for ''all pain 
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and suffering, if an;y, both mental and physical which 
he has endured since the time he sustained his injuries 
and that he will probably endure in the future." 
The jury was at no time invited to allow compen-
sation for nonexistent pain and suffering. The jury 
heard all of the evidence and argument of counsel for 
both sides based thereon. All legal presumptions favor 
the proposition that the jury complied with its oath to 
render a true verdict based upon the evidence as well as 
the instructions given to the court. 
In Wilkerson v. M cOarthy et al, supra, the United 
States Supreme Court stated: 
'' * * * Courts should not assume that in deter-
mining these questions of negligence juries will 
fall short of a fair performance of their consti-
tutional function. In rejecting a contention that 
juries could be expected to determine certain dis-
puted questions on whim, this Court, speaking 
through 1\:fr. Justice Holmes, said: 'But it must 
be assumed that the constitutional tribunal does 
its duty and finds facts only because they are 
proved.' Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 206." 
And in Schlatter v. McOMthy et al, 198 P. (2d) 473, 474, 
...... Utah ........ , this Court said on petition for rehearing: 
'' * * * We cannot know, and we are not at liber-
ty to speculate as to what reasoning prompted 
the jury to use the base figure of $300 per month 
in determining what the award for general dam-
ages should be. We most certainly .cannot presume 
that the jury ignored completely the extensive 
evidence of pain and suffering, and that it made 
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an award for loss in earning capaeity far in ex-
cess of what the evidence showed the loss in earn-
ing capacity to be. TVe m'llst presume, in the ab-
sence of any clear showing to the contrary, that 
the ju.ry acted in a.ccordamce with its sworn duty, 
and that a Sttbstantial portion of the general ver-
dict must be allocated to pain and sufferiJng." 
Presumably when the court instructed that the jury 
could allow compensation for mental and physical pain, 
if any, plaintiff would probably endure in the future, if 
there was no evidence from which a jury could infer 
that plaintiff would suffer future pain, the jury, in com-
pliance with its oath, would not and did not allow com-
pensation therefor. The instruction as has been pointed 
out, correctly states the law applicable to damages in 
this case. The jury heard the evidence and is the duly 
authorized finder of the fact. If the jury was influenced 
by bias and prejudice or was a type of jury that might 
conceivably allow damages for nonexistent pain and suf-
fering it seems unreasonable that they would have found 
plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence and deducted 
$3,500.00 from the verdict. 
The trial court who heard all of the evidence, ob-
served the witnesses with respect to their honesty and 
candor and observed the conduct of the jury throughout 
the trial, determined in overruling defendant's motion 
for a new trial that the jury's conduct was above re-
proach. The trial court, observing Charles Thomas Duf-
fy's general inclination to modesty and underemphasis 
rather than overemphasis determined that not only from 
his conduct during the trial of the case, but from his 
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evidence and that of Dr. Rees Anderson, the verdict 
was not so excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice 
or any other form of misconduct on the part of the jury 
and overruled defendant's motion for a new trial. That 
court, having determined that its discretionary power 
should not be exercised, defendant now comes before the 
appellate court requesting a determination that from the 
use of the terms ''future mental and physical pain and 
suffering which he will probably endure in the future, 
if any," the jury disregarded its oath and took into 
consideration so-called nonexistent evidence in rendering 
its verdict. We cannot believe that such was the case. If 
the jury concluded that plaintiff would not endure 
pain and suffering in the future, then the natural pre-
sumption is that the jury did not include in its assessment 
of damages any sum for future pain and suffering, but 
certainly it was proper for the court, in view of the 
evidence, to suggest a consideration of these matters. 
Under the instruction the court left it entirely to the 
jury to determine whether there would be future effects 
from the injuries sustained. The jury and the trial judge 
were in the best position to evaluate the testimony 
of the witnesses as well as the character and type of 
individual who is the plaintiff in this action. 
It will be observed that in the case at bar the criti-
cized instruction is not an instruction directing the jury 
to specifically find damages for plaintiff on account of 
future pain and suffering, but merely sets forth the 
standards by which the jury should be guided in de-
termining the amount of compensation to which plain-
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tiff was entitled in the event the issues on liability were 
determined adversely to the defendant. 
A case which holds such an instruction proper is the 
case of City of Paducah v. Brunnhoper (1939) 281 Ky. 
177, 135 S. "\V. (2d) 413, 417, wherein the court stated: 
·· ~l further obj~tion urged is that 'the court 
erred in its instruction to the jury to find dam-
ages for the plaintiff on account of permanent in-
juries, there being no definite and positive proof 
that she received permanent injuries of any kind.' 
''This criticism of the instruction we con-
ceive is also unwarranted, in that no instruction 
was given directing the jury to specifically find 
damages for plaintiff on account of permanent 
injuries, but on the other hand, the court only in-
structed the jury as to the measure of damages 
to be applied in awarding compensatory damages 
by its instruction No. 5, wherein the jury was told 
that if it found for the plaintiff, it would award 
her such sum in damages as it believed from the 
evidence would fairly and reasonably compensate 
her for physical pain and mental s-qffering, if any 
of either, that she had already suffered or which 
appeared reasonably certain she would suffer as 
the direct and proximate result of her injury, not 
exceeding $10,000; and such further sum as it be-
lieved from the evidence reasonably represented 
tiine lost as the direct and proximate result of 
the injury and doctors' bills, not to exceed $100 
for each of the last two items.'' 
Defendant has argued that there is no affirmative 
evidence of future pain and suffering in this case. The 
jury, however, is allowed great latitude in dra-wing infer-
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ences from known facts. It is no answer to say that the 
jury's verdict requires some speculation and conjecture. 
T n all doubtful fields of human experience a certain 
amount of speculation and conjecture is necessary. Who 
can say when a man loses an arm or a leg whether he 
will be able to adjust himself to the challenge of life 
and become an even more useful citizen, or whether he 
will grieve and die~ When a father loses his life who 
is to say whether the widow will remarry within a year 
or will live out her life span alone and friendless~ Who 
is to say whether Charles Thomas Duffy will worry and 
suffer in the future from the possibility of a recur-
rence of the incisional hernia; whether the hernia will 
actually recur; or whether he will reach a perfect ad-
justment following his injury~ The reason for our jury 
system and for reliance upon ·a jury of eight impartial 
citizens is that the combined human experience of such 
individuals has been demonstrated as the most desirable 
tribunal to weigh facts against their own life experience 
and draw reasonable inferences from known facts. 
In a recent United States Supreme Court decision, 
Lavender v. Kurn, 66 S. Ct. 740, ________________________________________ , 
the court stated: 
"It is no answer to say that the jury's ver-
dict involved speculation and conjectur.e. When-
ever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such 
that fair-minded men may draw different infer-
ences, a n1easure of speculation and conjecture is 
required on the part of those whose duty it is 
to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to 
them to be the rnost reasonable inference. Only 
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u:hen there is a complete abse·uce of prulJllfii'C 
facts to support the conclusion reached does a 
rerersible error appear. But where, as here, there 
is evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the 
jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever 
facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the 
appellate court's function is exhausted when the 
evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being im-
material that the court might draw a contrary in-
ference or feel that another conclusion is more 
reasonable.'' 
This Court has heretofore given expression to the 
right of a jury to call upon its own common experience 
in drawing inferences from known facts. See Schlatter 
v. McCarthy, et al, supra, where it is stated: 
" * * * It should be noted here that plaintiff was 
not trained or qualified to engage in any other 
gainful oc<?upation. And even if plaintiff were 
able to return to railroad work, it is fairly infer-
able that he would not be able to work so many 
hours as before, due to his weakened condition. 
It is also inferable that even if plaintiff would 
be able to return to his railroad work, that he 
would not be able to continue in employment for 
as many years as if he had not been injured.'' 
Another matter which indicates that this instruC-
tion was not prejudicial is the fact that the verdict re-
turned was not excessive under the evidence and award-
ed plaintiff only such damages as constitute fair and just 
compensation for the injuries suffered by him. This 
matter will be discussed in Point V. hereof. 
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POINT V. 
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT SO EXCESSIVE AS 
TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS DICTATED BY PASSION 
OR PREJUDICE. 
Charles Thomas Duffy suffered a severe and pain-
ful injury as a direct result of defendant's negligent con-
duct. It will be recalled that after his original opera-
tion for removal of the gall bladder he recuperated nor-
mally and was discharged from the doctor's care as be-
ing in proper condition to return to his employment. 
He had undergone an extremely serious operation, 
involving retraction of the stomach, removal of the gall 
bladder, ligation of the blood vessels and other parts of 
the anatomy, and suturing of the several layers of skin, 
fat tissue and muscle, lining the abdominal cavity. The 
operation necessitated the placing of a drain in the in-
cision. 
Approximately three months thereafter, and after 
plaintiff had been performing the duties of his employ-
ment without incident for some period of time, the in-
cisional hernia was incurred. Plaintiff felt "an awful 
sharp pain at the time" and also testified that "it felt 
as though water was running out in the vicinity of his 
previous operation.'' Th~ury properly found that plain-
tiff's mental anguish and worry over his condition af-
ter having undergone such a serious operation was ex-
tensive and extreme in addition to the physical pain and 
suffering which he endured. The doctor testified that he 
did not advise an operation immediately after the acci-
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dent becau~e ''I don't think that he was particularly pre-
pared to undergo another operation, n1entnll:·, at that 
particular time" (R. 188). The second operation was 
performed involving an incision along side the previous 
incision, approxin1ately ten inches in length, necessitat-
ing again separating the various layers of skin, fat and 
muscle, lining the abdominal wall and resuturing, using 
approximately fifty stitches. Apparently the stomach 
and the fascia in the upper portion of the abdomen, the 
intestines and possibly the colon, had protruded through 
the previous incision in the abdon1inal wall. The doctor 
testified that heavy straining would cause the abdominal 
organs to protrude through the skin portion of the stom-
ach wall resulting in the incisional hernia which plain-
tiff acquired in manipulating the switch. 
Plaintiff was hospitalized for thirteen days follow-
ing the operation and did not return to work for ap-
proximately three months. Following the operation he 
complained of pain .which the doctor attributed to the 
technical procedure of the operation and the type of su-
turing that was performed. The doctor testified that 
the tendency of this type of hernia to recur is con-
siderable (R. 193) and that the tendency of the hernia to 
recur in this case was increased because of the poor 
tissue, the poor fascia and possibly improper healing. 
The injury which plaintiff sustained necessitated 
a very serious major operation. It is within common ex-
perience that such operations undermine the general 
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health, cause untold mental anguish with attendant phy-
sical discomfort and suffering as well. We all know that 
worry, anxiety and other forms of mental pain can and 
do cause physical symptoms such as high blood pressure 
and actual physical discomfort. People are constantly 
requiring rest cures and hospitalization brought on by 
nervous breakdowns and other forms of worry. The pain 
and suffering caused by mental anguish cannot be dis-
associated from actual physical discomfort. 
The jury considering all of these elements could 
well have found and did find that Charles Thomas Duf-
fy's physical and mental pain and suffering was v-ery 
real and substantial, and that he was entitled to liberal 
remuneration therefor. It was stipulated that the lost 
wages suffered by Mr. Duffy as a direct result of the 
injury was $1300.00. 'The jury found that for his pain 
and suffering and loss of bodily function he was reason-
ably entitled to an additional sum of $11,200.00, and 
from the $12,500.00 verdict they deducted $3,500.00 for 
contributory negligence. 
The trial court, viewing the evidence, hearing the ar-
gument of counsel and being fully advised in all particu-
lars, refused to reduce the amount of the verdict or to 
grant a new trial. 
We have not cited cases illustrating verdicts com-
parable to the verdict in this case. The facts concerning 
plaintiff's injuries are peculiar and must be examined 
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on their own merit and as was said in ll/ QAfee r. Og-
den t'nion Ry. tt Depot Go., (1923) 62 Utah 115, 218 P. 
98, 104: 
"Yerdicts rendered 10, 15, or 20 years ago 
are of little help in determining what amount is 
now excessive in a personal injury case. The pres-
ent cost of living must be considered, ancl the di-
minished purchasing power of the dollar must be 
taken into consideration when estimating dam-
ages. In Coke v. Timby, 57 Utah 53, 192 Pac. 624, 
it is said: 
'' 'A few years ago such a sum might not 
have been awarded by a jury, but in this day of 
high prices the amount awarded cannot be said 
to be excessive.' '' 
Whether this court will interfere with a verdict up-
on the ground of excessiveness has been considered in 
many cases and rules have been established for the de-
termination of this question. 
In Pauly v. McCartlvy et al, 109 Utah 398, 184 P. 
(2d) 123, the court stated: 
"Where we can say, as a matter of law, that 
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have 
been given under the influence of passion or pre-
judice, and the trial court abused its discretion 
or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a 
motion for a new trial, we may order the verdict 
set aside, and a new trial granted. Jensen v. D. 
& R. G. Ry. Co., supra; and other cases cited 
above following that decision. But mere exces-
siveness of a verdict, without more, does not ne-
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cessarily show that the verdict was arrived at by 
passion or prejudice. Stephens Ranch & Livestock 
Co. v. U. P. Ry. Co., supra. It is true that the 
verdict might be so grossly excessive and dis-
proportionate to the injury that we could say 
from that fact alone that as a matter of law the 
verdict must have been arrived at by passion or 
prejudice. But the facts must be such that the 
excess can be determined as a matter of law, or 
the verdict must be so excessive as to be shocking 
to one's conscience and to clearly indicate pas-
sion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the 
jury. McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 
supra; Ward v. D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co., supra. This 
is not such a case. 
''The verdict here was admittedly liberal. 
But the mere fact that it was more than another 
jury, or more than this court might have given, 
or even more than the evidence justified, does not 
conclusively show that it was the result of pas-
sion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the 
jury. 
"The jury is allowed great latitude in as-
sessing damages for personal injuries. Miller v. 
So. Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d 865. The pres-
ent cost of living and the dilninished purchasing 
power of the dollar may be taken into considera-
tion when estimating damages. Coke v. Timby, 57 
Utah 53, 192 P. 624; :McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. 
& Depot Co., supra. 
''We can discover nothing in this case, ex-
cept the amount of the verdict, which indicates 
passion or prejudice, and, as we have seen, pas-
sion and prejudice are not necessarily inferred 
from an excessive verdict, without more. :\To ex-
ception was taken to the jury or any member 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
83 
thereof. No conduct on the part of the jury, evinc-
ing passion and prejudice has been ealled to our 
attention. The only point of complaint is the size 
of verdict." 
It is with great reluctance that courts interfere with 
the verdicts of juries on the ground that the damages 
awarded are excessive. In the Pauly case this Court 
pointed out: ''But, although we have the power to order 
a new trial in case of an excessive verdict, it is a power 
which we have rarely, if ever, exercised." That these 
rules are followed by courts in determining whether or 
not they should set aside a verdict because of the amount 
of damages awarded is understandable when the type 
and elements of damages involved in personal injury 
cases are considered. 
In the case at bar the elements of damage, which 
were disputed, were mental and physical pain and suf-
fering and loss of bodily function which plaintiff had 
suffered or which plaintiff would probably suffer in the 
future, if any. No standard has been or can be devised 
for calculation with any degree of exactitude money 
damages for these elements of loss. Of necessity the trl~ 
bunal required to fix the amount of damages must be al~ 
lowed a large degree of discretion in so doing. The jury 
is the tribunal empowered to determine and fix damages. 
This is especially true under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act. 
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cessarily show that the verdict was arrived at by 
passion or prejudice. Stephens Ranch & Livestock 
Co. v. U. P. Ry. Co., supra. It is true that the 
verdict might be so grossly excessive and dis-
proportionate to the injury that we could say 
from that fact alone that as a matter of law the 
verdict must have been arrived at by passion or 
prejudice. But the facts must be such that the 
excess can be determined as a matter of law, or 
the verdict must be so excessive as to be shocking 
to one's conscience and to clearly indicate pas-
sion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the 
jury. McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 
supra; Ward v. D. & R. G. W. Ry. Co., supra. This 
is not such a case. 
''The verdict here was admittedly liberal. 
But the mere fact that it was more than another 
jury, or more than this court might have given, 
or even more than the evidence justified, does not 
conclusively show that it was the result of pas-
sion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the 
jury. 
"The jury is allowed great latitude in as-
sessing damages for personal injuries. Miller v. 
So. Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d 865. The pres-
ent cost of living and the diminished purchasing 
power of the dollar may be taken into considera-
tion when estimating damages. Coke v. Timby, 57 
Utah 53, 192 P. 624; :McAfee v. Ogden Union Ry. 
& Depot Co., supra. 
''We can discover nothing in this case, ex-
cept the amount of the verdict, which indicates 
passion or prejudice, and, as we have seen, pas-
sion and prejudice are not necessarily inferred 
from an excessive verdict, without more. No ex-
ception was taken to the jury or any member 
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thereof. No conduct on the part of the jury, evinc-
ing passion and prejudice has been called to our 
attention. The only point of complaint is the size 
of verdict. '' 
It is with great reluctance that courts interfere with 
the verdicts of juries on the ground that the damages 
awarded are excessive. In the Pauly case this Court 
pointed out: ''But, although we have the power to order 
a new trial in case of an excessive verdict, it is a power 
which 'Ye have rarely, if ever, exercised.'' That these 
rules are followed by courts in determining whether or 
not they should set aside a verdict because of the amount 
of damages awarded is understandable when the type 
and elements of damages involved in personal injury 
cases are considered. 
In the case at bar the elements of damage, which 
were disputed, were mental and physical pain and suf-
fering and loss of bodily function which plaintiff had 
suffered or which plaintiff would probably suffer in the 
future, if any. No standard has been or can be devised 
for calculation with any degree of exactitude money 
damages for these elements of loss. Of necessity the tr1~ 
bunal required to fix the amount of damages must be al-
lowed a large degree of discretion in so doing. The jury 
is the tribunal empowered to determine and fix damages. 
This is especially true under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act. 
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The rule to be followed is well stated in 15 .A.m. Jur. 
620, Damages, Sec. 204: 
''It may be laid down as a general principle 
that the determination of the amount of damages 
in an action is primarily the province of the jury 
under proper instructions by the trial court, and 
the courts are generally reluctant to interfere 
with their verdict when it is challenged either as 
excessive or inadequate, and apart from any ob-
jection to the correctness of the instructions giv-
en or refused by the court.'' 
And again in 15 Am. Jur. 621, Sec. 205: 
''In actions sounding in damages merely, 
where the law furnishes no legal rule for meas-
uring them, the amount to be awarded rests large-
ly in the discretion of the jury, and with their 
verdict the courts are reluctant to interfere.'' 
This Court has stated in Jensen v. D. & R. G. R. Co., 
5M Utah 100, 138 P. 1185, that although the foregoing 
is true, the jury cannot be permitted to go unbridled 
and unchecked and that the courts have the power of 
supervision under the rules above set forth. The trial 
court must exercise a discretionary power over the 
amount of the verdict and the rule in this respect is 
stated in 15 Am. Jur. 622, Damages, Sec. 205, as follows: 
''The question of the excessiveness of a ver-
dict is generally one for the determination of 
the trial court in the first instance, and its ac-
tion in granting or refusing to grant a new trial 
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on that ground will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless an abuse of discretion is shown.'' 
The defendants in the case at bar sought to invoke 
the exercise of this discretionary power of the trial court. 
They made a motion for a new trial and one of the 
grounds urged by them was that the verdict of the jury 
was excessive, it "appearing to have been given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice.'' The trial court 
denied the motion for a new trial, thereby placing the 
stamp of approval upon the amount of the verdict ren-
dered by the jury. As stated in Stephens Ranch & Live 
Stock Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 
459 at 462: 
'' * * ':~ Necessarily upon such a question ap-
pellate courts must, to a large extent, rely upon 
the judgment and discretion of the trial court. 
That court is in a much better position to observe 
and determine whether a jury was actuated by 
passion or prejudice, or by both, in returning a 
verdict for an amount larger than the evidence 
justifies, or whether the jury was merely mis-
taken with regard to the amount that should have 
been allowed.'' 
Hence, when defendants come to this Court assert-
ing that the verdict is greater than the evidence justi-
fies they are faced with the burden of convincing, this 
Court that the amount of damages so rendered was so 
excessive as to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice and that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. De-
fendants in their brief have not undertaken to discharge 
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this duty, but apparently take the position that to set 
aside the verdict they need only establish insufficiency 
of the evidence to support the amount of the verdict, 
when the amount rendered was largely within the dis-
cretion of the jury and within the discretion of the trial 
court in ruling upon the motion for a new trial. 
That defendants' position cannot be sustained on au-
thority is shown by the following language contained in 
Stephens Ranch & Live Stock Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 
supra: 
'' * * * But it does not necessarily follow that 
because the jury returns a verdict in which a 
greater sum is allowed than is authorized by the 
evidence for that reason alone the verdict is the 
result of passion or prejudice. If such were the 
Tule, all cases in which excessive verdicts are re-
turned would have to be retried.'' 
Under the foregoing well-established rules we do 
not believe that defendants have met the requirements 
placed upon them by the law to support a successful 
attack of the verdict on the ground that it is larger 
than the evidence justifies. This entire matter should be 
considered from the same standpoint and in the same 
light as the damage verdict was considered in the Pa.t~ly 
case and the many cases therein cited from this Court 
where this matter has heretofore been given considera-
tion. As stated in Browning v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 
197, 207 P. 462, at 464: 
" * * * However, the only question for de-
termination by this court is, Can it be determined 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--· 
87 
as a n1atter of law, under the cirrumstanres, that 
the dan1ages werp so exressiye as to appear to 
have been given under the influence of passion 
or prejudice~'' 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully sub1nitted that all questions per-
taining to liability were properly presented to the jury 
by the instructions, and that there was a firm eviden-
tiary foundation for the verdict in favor of plaintiff. 
The injuries which plaintiff suffered in the course 
of his employment through the negligence of the de-
fendant in maintaining the switch, were serious injuries 
requiring a major operation. The rupturing of the mus-
cles and fascia of his abdomen weakened his body to the 
extent that the chances of a recurrence were in the words 
of the doctor "considerable.'' Under all the circum-
stances presented by the record in this case we submit 
that the plaintiff was awarded only just and fair com-
pensation for his injuries. 
We therefore respectfully submit that the jury's 
verdict should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK & ROBERTS 
WAYNE L. BLACK 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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